Granted
Professions: Mandatory New Lawyer Oath
His Majesty the King in Right of Alberta v. Wirring, 2025 ABCA 413 (42224)
Mr. Wirring was a member of the Khalsa community of Sikhs and an amritdhari Sikh. His strict religious beliefs were not questioned by Alberta. To become a member of the Khalsa, Mr. Wirring took an oath submitting himself to the Guru Granth Sahib and to Akal Purakh, the Creator, and he confirmed he would not give allegiance to or devote himself to any other figure or entity. Having obtained a law degree and completed his articles, Mr. Wirring wanted to be admitted to the Law Society in Alberta and to practice law in Alberta, but candidates were required to take the Oath of Allegiance: “I ___ swear I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Her heirs and successors, according to law.” Mr. Wirring believed making the Oath would break his oath to Akal Purakh, as a result of which he would no longer be an amritdhari Sikh. He felt his only alternative was to practice law in a province which does not require an oath of allegiance, meaning he would have to uproot his family and live apart from his extended family and friends. Mr. Wirring issued a statement of claim challenging the requirement to take the Oath under ss. 2(a) and 15 of the Charter. He sought a declaration under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act to that effect and an order exempting him from taking the Oath. He moved for summary judgment; Alberta cross-applied for summary dismissal. The Law Society of Alberta took no position. The chambers judge dismissed the application to strike the Charter claim, but allowed the application to dismiss it. After the chamber’s decision was released, Mr. Wirring transferred his Law Society membership from Saskatchewan to Alberta based on a licence transfer process made available earlier that year. It did not require him to take the Oath. As of the appeal hearing, he was a non-practising member of the Alberta bar. The Alta. C.A. allowed the appeal and declared the requirement to take the Oath unconstitutional and of no force or effect. “The application for leave to appeal…is granted with costs in the cause.”
Dismissed
Civil Litigation: Dismissal
Celik v. TD Canada Trust, et al., 2025 ONCA (42112)
In March 1995, the Applicant purchased a bank draft on the strength of a letter of credit in the amount of USD$240K. The funds were drawn on Citibank, a bank located in the U.S., and eventually deposited in a Canada Trust account. After the draft was issued, Citibank concluded documents supporting the letter of credit were fraudulent; it requested the Respondent bank return the funds and the Respondent complied. In 2015, the Applicant commenced an action against the Respondents, arguing returning the funds to Citibank was wrongful. That action was dismissed as time-barred and an appeal was unsuccessful. The Applicant then commenced another action based on the same allegations. That action was dismissed as res judicata and as an abuse of process. A further appeal was unsuccessful. The Applicant then commenced this proceeding, also based on the same allegations. The Respondents moved to strike the action. The motion judge held the action was barred by cause of action and issue estoppel, and it was an abuse of process. The action was struck without leave to amend. The Applicant appealed. At the Respondents’ request, the Ont. C.A. concluded the appeal was an abuse of process and exercised its discretionary power under Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss it summarily. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Civil Litigation: Dismissal
Haller v. The Right Honourable Mary Simon, Governor General of Canada, 2025 FCA (42128)
In November 2023, the Applicant, Jacqualine Haller, publicly announced her candidacy for the Office of Prime Minister of Canada. In July 2025, Ms. Haller filed a Statement of Claim in Fed. Court against the Respondent, the Right Honourable Mary Simon, Governor General of Canada, alleging the April 2025 federal election prevented Ms. Haller from seeking election as Prime Minister of Canada as an independent candidate and without first being elected as a Member of Parliament or being a member of a political party. The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the Governor General, sought to have the Ms. Haller’s action dismissed. The Fed. Court of Canada ordered Ms. Haller’s statement of claim be removed from the court file, and her action be dismissed in its entirety, without leave to amend or refile the action. The F.C.A. unanimously upheld this decision; it ordered Ms. Haller’s Notice of Appeal be removed from the court file, and the court file be closed. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Class Actions: Secondary Market Misrepresentation
Akumin Inc., et al. v. Terry Longair Professional Corporation, 2025 ONCA 606 (42077)
Akumin Inc. issued common shares and secured notes. Allegedly, share price declines were precipitated by disclosures of accounting errors. Expert evidence agrees one common share price decline followed one disclosure but otherwise disputes whether price declines followed other announcements and causal links. Terry Longair Professional Corporation commenced a claim alleging breaches of the Securities Act and negligence, including claims of material misstatements that constitute primary market misrepresentation and secondary market misrepresentation that were corrected. Leave is required to proceed with the claim alleging secondary market misrepresentation. Terry Longair Professional Corporation brought a motion for leave and applied for certification of a class proceeding. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted leave to proceed with a claim under s. 138.3(1) of the Securities Act for secondary market misrepresentation and certified as a class proceeding a claim for secondary market misrepresentation under s. 138.3(1), a claim for primary market misrepresentation under s. 130.1 of the Securities Act and a negligence claim. The Ont. C.A. dismissed an appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Criminal Law: Homicide
H.V.M. v. R., 2025 ABCA 141 (42148)
There is a publication ban in this case, and certain information is not available to the public, in the context of a second degree murder conviction. “The motion for an extension of time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Offences; Delay
A.N. v. R., 2025 ONCA 300 (41863)
There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of sexual offences convictions and alleged delay. “The motion for an extension of time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Employment Law: Limitation Periods
Fearing v. GardaWorld Cash Services Canada Corporation, 2025 FCA 168 (42086)
Mr. Fearing was hired as an armed guard by GardaWorld Cash Services Canada Corporation in 2019. His employment was terminated on July 29, 2020. On August 22, 2020, Mr. Fearing filed a complaint with the Labour Program of Employment and Social Development Canada, alleging the non-payment of wages for a period of training that took place between April 8 and 17, 2019. The Labour Affairs Officer (LAO) concluded the wages sought fell outside the statutory six-month limitation period set out in para. 251.01(2)(a) of the Canada Labour Code and confirmed this decision in the notice of unfounded complaint issued on June 25, 2021. The Canada Industrial Relations Board dismissed the appeal. The Fed. C.A. dismissed the application for J.R. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Employment Law: Pregnancy; Police
Ville de Québec v. Ouellet, 2025 QCCA 825 (42006)
The Respondent, Johanie Ouellet, was a patrol sergeant with the police force of the Applicant, Ville de Québec (“City”). Being pregnant, she gave the City a medical certificate confirming her pregnancy and indicating her work carried risks for herself or her unborn child. She requested reassignment to duties she was capable of performing, but the City refused, and she was preventively withdrawn from work. Following this refusal, she filed a complaint with the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (“CNESST”), alleging reprisals or discriminatory measures. The CNESST found the complaint inadmissible, a decision confirmed by the ALT, which found an employer is under no obligation to reassign a worker and the decision is within its right of management. The Québec Superior Court allowed Ms. Ouellet’s J.R., set aside the ALT’s decision and referred the matter back to it, finding its interpretation of ss. 40 and 41 of the AROHS unreasonable, in light of Dionne. The Québec C.A. dismissed the City’s appeal, finding the Superior Court had not committed any error, and it confirmed an employer does not have an obligation of result with regard to reassignment but it has to examine a worker’s request and take reasonable measures to act on it; when reassignment is impossible, it must inform the worker of the reasons why. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Human Rights: Discrimination
Coote v. British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, 2025 BCCA 409 (42138)
The Applicant, Claufield Coote, filed a complaint with the Respondent, the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”), against the B.C. Civil Liberties Association (“BCCLA”) and certain named individuals, alleging the BCCLA singled him out for differential and adverse treatment based on a prohibited ground of discrimination listed in the B.C. Human Rights Code. The Tribunal declined to accept Mr. Coote’s complaint, on the basis it failed to set out an arguable contravention of the Code. The Tribunal then issued a second decision, dismissing Mr. Coote’s application for reconsideration of the first Tribunal decision, and dismissing his request for recusal of the Tribunal member who had issued the first decision. The chambers judge at the B.C.S.C. dismissed Mr. Coote’s petition for J.R. of both Tribunal decisions, finding neither decision was patently unreasonable. The B.C.C.A. dismissed Mr. Coote’s appeal from the chambers judge’s decision. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Labour Law: Employer Compliance With Arbitration Award
Kuca v. George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology, 2025 ONCA (42103)
The Applicant worked at George Brown College (College) until her employment was terminated for cause. The Applicant was a member of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (the “Union”). The Applicant filed a grievance which was referred to arbitration before the Arbitration Board (the “Board”). On November 2, 2010, the Board issued its award and ordered the College to compensate the Applicant for her loss of employment. A supplementary award was issued on September 26, 2011, wherein the Board ordered the College to pay the Applicant damages in the sum of $127,059, as compensation for her loss of employment. In the supplementary award, the Board ordered the College to comply with any lawful direction by the Applicant, received within 30 days of the date of the award to pay the compensation in a particular manner to minimize the impact of income tax. On October 6, 2011, counsel for the Union emailed the College’s counsel with the Applicant’s directions. The direction requested the College pay the Applicant in three installments, over a three-year period, 2011, 2012 and 2013. On December 8, 2011, the Applicant commenced an application at the Superior Court, seeking to enforce the Board’s supplementary award terms. Next counsel for the College received a letter from the Applicant’s newly retained lawyer. The letter returned the cheques and asked the cheques be re-issued payable to the Applicant’s Registered Pension Plan. The cheques were reissued, but payable to the Applicant, as per the initial directions. Ultimately, the Applicant cashed the cheques. In October 2012, the Applicant issued an amended application, claiming the College did not follow her instructions. Chiappetta J. found the College complied with the arbitration award. Shore J. dismissed the motion to transfer the appeal to the Ont. C.A. and dismissed the appeal. The Ont. C.A. dismissed the motion for leave to appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Labour Law: Fair Representation
Fearing v. Canada Council of Teamsters, et al., 2025 FCA 167 (42088)
Mr. Fearing was a union member of the Canada Council of Teamsters (union). Mr. Fearing worked for GardaWorld Cash Services Canada Corporation from May 2019 to the end of July 2020, when he was terminated by the employer. The union representing Mr. Fearing filed grievances on his behalf including a grievance challenging the termination. The union ultimately exercised its discretion not to refer the grievances to arbitration. Mr. Fearing advanced a duty of fair representation complaint after the union declined to advance some of his grievances to arbitration. The Canada Industrial Relations Board dismissed the duty of fair representation complaint. Reconsideration of that decision was dismissed. The Fed. C.A. dismissed the J.R. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs to the respondent Canada Council of Teamsters.”
Labour Law: Grievances
Palmer v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 185 (42134)
Mr. Palmer was a former employee of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). After Mr. Palmer was terminated in 2003, he launched several complaints over the years to the former Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) under s. 41 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act as it read at the time of his complaints. SIRC dismissed Mr. Palmer’s complaint alleging assault, and ensuing retaliation and harassment based on subs. 41(2) of the Act, which prohibited the SIRC from investigating complaints in respect of which the complainant is entitled to seek redress by means of a grievance procedure established pursuant to the CSIS Act or the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act. The SIRC concluded, though Mr. Palmer had not raised the assault allegations in his grievance procedure, he could have done so. The Fed. Court dismissed the application for J.R. The Fed. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.’
Tax: Connectedness of Corporations
Vefghi Holding Corporation, et al. v. R., 2025 FCA 143 (42041)
The Applicants are not related corporations but engaged in transactions that led the Minister of National Revenue to assess them for tax under Part IV of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”). The Part IV tax was assessed on deemed dividends received by the Applicants in their capacity as beneficiaries of trusts that owned the shares on which dividends were paid. The corporations paying the dividends were “connected” with the Applicant corporations within the meaning of Part IV at the time the transactions occurred, but ceased to be so controlled prior to the trust’s year-end. A corporation receiving a dividend from a payor corporation to which it is connected is not liable for Part IV tax. The parties stated a question to the Tax Court to determine the point in time at which connectedness is determined for the purpose of Part IV. The Tax Court judge determined the connectedness of the relevant corporations is determined on the date the relevant trust receives the dividend from the payor corporation, unless the recipient corporation’s taxation year-end precedes that of the trust’s, in which case connectedness is determined in the subsequent taxation year of the recipient corporation. The Fed. C.A. allowed the Minister’s appeal, holding the words of s. 104(19) of the Act could not bear this dual interpretation. The connectedness of the relevant corporations is determined at the relevant trust’s taxation year-end, even if this appears to run contrary to the purpose of Part IV. In the result, both Applicants were therefore liable for Part IV tax. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”