Granted
Professions: Pharmacists
Haggaï v. Loiselle, 2025 QCCA 932 (41976)
There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of alleged professional disciplinary complaints against a pharmacist. “The application for leave to appeal…is granted with costs in the cause. The schedule to serve and file appeal documents will be established by the Registrar. Justice Côté took no part in the judgment.”
Dismissed
Charter: Freedom on Religion; Equality
Dardari, et al. v. Québec (Attorney General) et al., 2025 QCCA 892 (42011)
A court of first instance of Tangier in Morocco made an order granting the Applicants Abdelaziz Dardari and Hanane Hasni, both Canadian and Moroccan citizens of the Muslim faith, the kafala of a child, that is, the taking charge of a child. The Applicants then took a series of steps to be able to return to the country with the child, including an application for Canadian citizenship. That application was denied on the ground taking charge by kafala cannot be equated with adoption under Québec law. The Applicants challenged the constitutionality of the federal and Québec provisions allowing a Canadian resident to sponsor a child as a member of the family class only if the child is their biological or adopted child. The Québec Superior Court: dismissed the applications seeking to establish the rights to freedom of religion and equality were infringed; efforts were not based on the need to respect a religious belief, but rather on the desire to have a child; regulations raised had no impact on this belief; no evidence was provided the regulations have a disproportionate effect on Canadian citizens of the Muslim faith or that Muslims are historically or systemically disadvantaged. The Qué. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs to the respondent, Attorney General of Canada.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Offences
Hardy v. R., 2025 QCCA 1165 (42065)
There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of alleged sexual offences. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Municipal Law: Renovations
Smith v. City of Winnipeg, 2025 MBCA 15 (41994)
The Applicant, Mr. Smith, and the Respondent, the City of Winnipeg, were involved a long-running dispute over a building and property in downtown Winnipeg purchased by Mr. Smith with the intention of renovating it. Mr. Smith commenced various actions against the City, seeking damages and injunctions in relation to the renovation dispute. The City brought a motion for summary judgment, seeking to have all of Mr. Smith’s claims against it dismissed. A motion judge at the Court of King’s Bench granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed all claims. The Man. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The motion for an extension of time is granted. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Tax: Charities; Split-Receipting
Cloth v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 117 (41978)
Between 2001-2003, the Applicant and other donors made charitable donations pursuant to a “leveraged donation scheme”, which allowed for “split-receipting”, whereby taxpayers could make a partial cash donation (approximately 30% of the total amount) and then receive an interest-free loan for the balance of the donation, which would be paid back over time. Donors would still receive tax receipts for the full amount. In 2012-2013, amendments to the Income Tax Act effectively allowed “split-receipting”, with a retroactive application date of December 20, 2002. Later, the C.R.A. reassessed the tax returns of certain donors, including the Applicant, for the years 2001-2003, and denied the tax credits. The donors appealed to the Tax Court of Canada. Eventually, a Settlement Agreement provided for partial relief, based on the ITA amendments, but only for donations made after the retroactive application date of December 20, 2002. Donors excluded from such relief, including the Applicant, petitioned the Minister of Finance to exercise his discretion under s. 23(2) of the Financial Administration Act and recommend the “remission” of the tax amounts owing, alleging these amounts were “unreasonable or unjust”, or that it was “otherwise in the public interest” to remit the taxes owing. The Minister refused to recommend remission. The Fed. Court dismissed the Applicant’s J.R.; the Qué. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Telecommunications: Per-Subscriber Royalty Rates
Bell Canada, et al. v. Copyright Collective of Canada, et al., 2025 FCA 92 (41926)
The Applicant broadcasters were entitled, without prior authorization, to retransmit broadcast signals more than 32km from their source, and in exchange pay a per-subscriber royalty rate to the Respondent copyright collectives, who administer the copyright for the source signals. Every four years, the Copyright Board conducted proceedings in which broadcasters and copyright collectives made submissions on new per-subscriber royalty rates. At the conclusion of those proceedings, the Board fixed the new rates in a Tariff. In August 2019, the Board fixed rates for the 2014-2018 Tariff. The parties J.R.’d the Board’s decision. The Fed. C.A. held the Board relied on outdated data to fix the per-subscriber rates and applied a profit margin discount unsupported by the evidence. It remanded the matter to the Board with a direction to redetermine the Tariff without these errors. On redetermination, the Board corrected the errors identified by the Fed. C.A. However, it also made three further changes to its calculations to correct errors it discovered during the redetermination process. It held it would not be appropriate to purposefully ignore apparent errors, and doing so was not in conflict with the remand judgment of the Fed. C.A. The Fed. C.A., on further J.R.: the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by adjusting the Tariff in ways not contemplated in the remand judgment; the Board’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction conferred by the Fed. C.A.’s unambiguous judgment was neither correct nor reasonable; the Board was directed to calculate the Tariff in accordance with the earlier remand judgment and certify it. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Torts: Duty of Care; Mental Health
Shahid, et al. v. McKee, 2025 ONCA 666 (42109)
Mr. McKee, 27 years old, had a long history of addiction and mental health issues. Dr. Lorberg, a psychiatrist at Centre North Correctional Centre in Penetanguishene and the Ontario Addiction Treatment Centre (“OATC”) in Barrie, had been primary treating psychiatrist since August 2016. Dr. Shahid was a psychiatrist at the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health. Mr. McKee had been admitted to psychiatric facilities many times from 2016 onwards; he was on house arrest on, inter alia, a charge of assaulting his parents, with his parents as his legal sureties; in November 2018, he threatened to kill his parents and himself. Later that month, he was referred by the initial hospital to Waypoint for a psychiatric assessment with a recommendation he be admitted for long-term care. He was discharged a day later. On December 1, 2018, he overdosed on medications prescribed by Dr. Lorberg and was again admitted to the initial hospital. On December 12, he was again transferred to Waypoint with a recommendation of a prolonged admission for medication review and psychiatric observation. A letter from his parents detailing his deteriorating mental health and the failure of other treatment options, and pleading for long-term care, was included in the package sent to Waypoint. That day, Dr. Shahid, Waypoint’s attending psychiatrist, discharged Mr. McKee. On January 25, 2019, Mr. McKee was given a letter expressing concerns about assaultive behaviour at attending Dr. Lorberg’s clinic. On February 11, 2019, Mr. McKee experienced psychosis at his parents’ home. He stabbed his father in the neck with a knife, killing him, and stabbed himself. He was later found guilty of first degree murder, forcible confinement and uttering death threats in relation to his father’s death. The mother brought an action alleging Dr. Shahid and Dr. Lorberg were negligent in their treatment and in failing to warn of danger to them, and committed a series of acts and omissions. The motion judge: struck the negligence claim without leave to amend because a duty of care to the parents would conflict with the duty of care owed to Mr. McKee; also struck failure to warn, with leave to amend. The mother’s appeal of the former order was allowed. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”