Case: Dunlop v Carpenters’ Regional Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 2026 ABCA 88 (CanLII)
Keywords: labour law; disciplinary charges; exclusive jurisdiction
Synopsis:
The Respondent union receives a complaint about the Appellants, members of the union – it is alleged the Appellants are making unauthorized changes to union members’ health and wellness trust agreements and misappropriating pension funds. Disciplinary charges are filed by the union against the Appellants. (See para. 3).
A dispute arises as to the timing of these charges, however. The union’s constitution provides “[t]he Executive Committee shall dismiss any charge…that is filed more than six (6) months after the date the violation occurred or reasonably should have been discovered”. The Appellants’ position is that the charges are filed “well beyond the prescribed mandatory time limit” and ask that they be summarily dismissed. (See paras. 4-5). The Respondent union refuses to dismiss the charges and schedules a disciplinary trial, noting the “continuing nature” of the underlying conduct. (See paras. 4-6).
The Appellants apply to the Court of King’s Bench for “urgent injunctive and declaratory relief to stop the disciplinary trial”. The Chambers Judge (Akgungor J.) dismisses the application, finding the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Alberta Labour Relations Board. (See paras. 7-8). The Board subsequently dismisses the Appellants’ request for interim relief, which includes an allegation that the union’s Executive Committee is interpreting the constitution’s time limit in a “discriminatory manner”. The Appellants then appeal the decision of the Court of King’s Bench to the Court of Appeal. (See paras. 9-10). The Court of Appeal (Crighton and Feth JJ.A)[1] dismisses the appeal, agreeing with the Chambers Judge that the dispute falls within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction. (See para. 2).
Importance:
The key question was whether the Court of King’s Bench or the Board had jurisdiction over a dispute about internal union discipline allegedly applied in a “discriminatory manner”, contrary to s. 152(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1. (See para. 1).
The Court of Appeal describes the framework for determining jurisdiction as between the Board and the courts at paras. 13-17. Although a member can generally bring an action for breach of contractual terms – including a breach of the union’s constitution – the jurisdiction of a court is “abrogated where legislation conveys exclusive jurisdiction over a specific matter to an administrative body, such as the Board”. (See para. 13). For the Court of Appeal herein, the Code “expressly assigns to the Board the authority to regulate…aspects of the relationship between the union and its members” and the Board’s powers are “exclusive”. (See para. 15).
Therefore, where a dispute falls under provisions in the Code (i.e., where its “essential character” fits into the Board’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in Weber v. Ontario Hydro, 1995 CanLII 108 (SCC) at paras. 52-54 and Regina Police Assn Inc v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14 at paras. 25, 39), a court will lack jurisdiction over it. (See para. 16).
In this case, the Court of Appeal described the “essential character” of the Appellants’ dispute with the union as follows: “that the disciplinary actions against them breached the limitation provision in the constitution in a discriminatory manner.” For the Court, the “particulars of the essential character of the dispute” include:
[1] Chief Justice Khullar did not participate in the final disposition of the judgment.
[A]llegations that the Executive Committee’s refusal to dismiss the charges is “arbitrary” because the mandatory limitation period is not being enforced, “discriminatory” because the membership rules are being applied to the appellants less favourably than to other members, and “unreasonable” because the contractual language could not rationally and logically support the union’s interpretation, which failed to prevent the untimely pursuit of stale-dated allegations. (See para. 41).
The Court of Appeal determined that the material facts of these allegations fall within the scope of s. 152(1)(b) of the Code, which provides that “[n]o trade union or person acting on behalf of a trade union shall…take disciplinary action against or impose any form of penalty on a person by applying to the person in a discriminatory manner the standards of discipline of the trade union.” (See para. 42).
As described by the Court of Appeal, s. 152(1)(b) of the Code is offended where “standards of discipline are applied in a discriminatory manner. If a standard is expressed in the union’s constitution (such as a limitation period), neither the interpretation nor the application of that standard may distinguish between individuals or groups on grounds that are illegal, arbitrary or unreasonable”. (See para. 29). Without commenting on the merits of the Appellants’ allegations, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Chambers Judge made no error in declining jurisdiction because the Board has exclusive jurisdiction. (See para. 43).
Counsel for the Appellant: Marco Poretti (no appearance) (Reynolds Mirth Richards & Farmer, Edmonton) and Sebastien Anderson (Labour Rights Law, Coquitlam)
Counsel for the Respondents Carpenters’ Regional Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union 2103, and Local Union 2010: Jacob Axelrod (Nugent Law Office, Edmonton)
Counsel for the Respondent Kurt Kashuba: Adrienne Faulkner (Seveny Scott Lawyers, Edmonton)