Granted

Charter: Freedom of Religion

Vabuolas, et al. v. Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, et al., 2025 BCCA 83 (41816)
The Respondents, Mr. Gabriel-Liberty Wall and Mr. Gregory Westgarde, former members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, each submitted independent access requests pursuant to s. 23 of the B.C. Personal Information Protection Act (“PIPA”) for the disclosure of religious pastoral notes held by the Applicants Grand Forks Congregation Jehovah’s Witnesses and Coldstream Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, their former Jehovah’s Witnesses’ congregations. Mr. Wall’s request was denied by the Grand Forks Congregation on the grounds the records contained “privileged and confidential religious communications”. Similarly, Mr. Westgarde was initially informed by the Coldstream Congregation no personal information was held, but the Congregation later acknowledged while personal records did exist, they constituted confidential religious communications protected under the common law and the Charter. Dissatisfied with the responses received, the Respondents requested the B.C. Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (“Commissioner”) review the congregations’ decisions. The matter was referred to mediation by the Commissioner. After the failed mediation, the Commissioner assigned an adjudicator to conduct an inquiry under s. 50 of PIPA. Because of the constitutional issues raised, notice was also given to the Respondent the A.G. B.C. Despite finding the impugned provisions infringed the religious freedoms of Applicants and congregational elders Mr. John Vabuolas and Mr. Paul Sidhu under s. 2(a) of the Charter, the adjudicator concluded the infringement was justified under s. 1. The adjudicator ordered the Grand Forks and Coldstream Congregations to produce all records in their custody or control containing Mr. Wall and Mr. Westgarde’s personal information, for her review as the Commissioner’s delegate. The Applicants filed a J.R. of the adjudicator’s decision. The B.C.S.C. dismissed the J.R. and the B.C.C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is granted with costs in the cause.”

Dismissed

Aboriginal Law: Water Use; Dams

Chief Rene Chaboyer, Chief of Cumberland House Cree Nation, on his own behalf and on behalf of all other members of Cumberland House Cree Nation, et al. v. Saskatchewan Power Corporation, et al., 2025 SKCA 31 (41813)
In 2014, the Saskatchewan Power Company applied to the Water Services Agency to renew its licences to operate two dams on the Saskatchewan River, which drains into the Saskatchewan River Delta. Cumberland House Cree Nation (“CHCN”) and Opaskwayak Cree Nation (“OCN”) rely on the Delta for subsistence in the exercise of their Treaty and Aboriginal rights. The E.B. Campbell dam had operated it on a 50-year licence that expired in 2015. The Nipawin dam was constructed in 1986, and operated under an interim lease that expired in 2019. The Agency determined the licencing decisions triggered a duty to consult with First Nation and Métis communities. In June 2015, letters were sent to the Chiefs of CHCN and OCN inviting them to consult and to identify potential adverse impacts on the exercise of treaty or Aboriginal rights and traditional uses. Consultation occurred over approximately three years. In a decision concerning the interpretation of The Water Power Regulation, the Agency advised the affected First Nations and Métis communities of the applications and explained regulatory changes meant only new adverse impacts could be considered during the relicensing process. It acknowledged the physical dams were impacting sediment, causing sediment starvation downstream, and adversely affecting treaty rights, they did not fall within the scope of the duty to consult because they were not new issues. In October 2018, the Agency issued a final operating licence to continue to operate the Nipawin dam and a renewed licence to continue to operate the E.B. Campbell dam. The licencing conditions imposed include a requirement SaskPower establish a Stewardship Committee to examine the prospective and retrospective impacts of the dams. CHCN and OCN each applied for J.R. The applications were dismissed, as were the appeals from that decision. “The conditional motion filed by Opaskwayak Cree Nation for an oral hearing of the application for leave to appeal is dismissed. The applications for leave to appeal…are dismissed with costs to the Water Security Agency and Saskatchewan Power Corporation.”

Agriculture Law: Abattoirs

Abattoir Zampini Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 CAF 61 (41809)
Section 6.2 of the Health of Animals Regulations addresses the management of specified risk material linked to risks to animal health and human health in connection with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. This provision provides that specified risk material must be removed from cattle. As a result of inspecting the facilities of a local slaughterhouse, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency imposed an administrative monetary penalty on the Zampini abattoir for having not removed specified risk material at the moment of slaughter. The Canada Agricultural Review Tribunal allowed the abattoir’s request for review. The Tribunal found the Regulations allow a local slaughterhouse to remove the material other than at slaughter. It cancelled the administrative monetary penalty. The Fed. C.A. allowed the Agency’s J.R.: the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable because of two major deficiencies; it created separate regimes for the different types of abattoirs, contrary to the principle of universality; its interpretation of the Regulations undermines Parliament’s intention requiring specified risk material be removed at the slaughtering stage. The Fed. C.A. quashed the Tribunal’s decision and referred the matter back to it for redetermination. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”

Civil Litigation: Appeal Time Extensions

McCormack v. Alberta Health Services, et al., 2025 ABCA 156 (41842)
The Applicant was self-represented who commenced actions against a large number of defendants. The nature of his communications with the staff of the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta prompted staff members to refer them to the local administrative justice for action. The local administrative justice, on his own motion, found the Applicant’s communications with court staff were abusive and wasteful, and issued an order prohibiting him from communicating with the court by electronic means. The Applicant sought to appeal this order, but filed his notice of appeal out of time. A case management officer solicited a motion for an extension of time with a specified deadline. The deadline passed and the appeal was struck. The Applicant applied for an extension of time and an order restoring his appeal. A justice of the Alta. C.A. found the Applicant formed a timely intention to appeal and an extension would not prejudice the Respondents, but held those factors were outweighed by a lack of reasonable explanation for the delay and a lack of merit to the proposed appeal. The Applicant sought permission to appeal this decision to a full panel of the Alta. C.A. Permission was denied. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed. The Court did not consider any response to the application. Justice Moreau took no part in the judgment.”

Civil Litigation: Permanent Stays

Tewari v. Hantover Canada Inc., 2025 ONCA 261 (41843)
The Respondent brought a motion for a permanent or temporary stay of proceedings arguing the action was an abuse of process and a duplicate pleading because the factual allegations and claims against it were a replication of another action commenced against it on December 2023. The case stems from actions commenced by the Applicant alleging misuse of intellectual property for extending the shelf-life of meat products. The motion judge ordered a permanent stay. The Ont. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The motion to file a lengthy memorandum has been granted without costs. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs in accordance with the Tariff of fees and disbursements set out in Schedule B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.”

Criminal Law: Homicide

Tolchinsky v. R., 2025 ABCA 15 (41901)
During a home invasion the Applicant fatally shot a homeowner in the back. The Applicant, along with three other perpetrators, intended to steal valuables from the residence. The Applicant claimed the shooting was accidental, asserting the gun discharged unintentionally during a struggle with the victim. The trial judge found the Applicant guilty of first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, concluding the Applicant had subjective knowledge of the likelihood of the victim’s death when he pulled the trigger. The conviction appeal was dismissed. “The motion for an extension of time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”

Employment Law: Insurance Benefits

Chen v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 18 (41870)
Applicant Wei Chen applied for employment insurance benefits. His application was denied. Mr. Chen then pursued appeals before the Social Security Tribunal. The Tribunal’s General Division dismissed his appeal; the Appeal Division sent the matter back for reconsideration on procedural fairness grounds. Following reconsideration, the appeal was dismissed. The Appeal Division denied Mr. Chen’s request for leave to appeal from the reconsideration decision. Mr. Chen then sought J.R. of the Appeal Division’s decision to deny leave to appeal. The Fed. Court held the Appeal Division’s decision was reasonable, and dismissed the J.R. The Fed. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The motion for an extension of time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”

Environmental Law: Real Estate Development v. Frog

9255-2504 Québec inc., et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), et al., 2025 CAF 23 (41728)
The Applicants, 9255 2504 Québec inc., 142550 Canada inc. and Grand Boisé de La Prairie inc., acquired lands in La Prairie, a city located on the South Shore of Montréal, to develop a residential project. That project, called the “Symbiocité project”, consisted in six phases of development schedule to be finished in 2019. However, the lands in question turned out to be the natural habitat of a population of Western Chorus Frogs, classified as a “vulnerable wildlife species” since 2001 pursuant to the Québec Act respecting threatened or vulnerable species. In 2008, La Prairie obtained a certificate of authorization pursuant to s. 22 of the Environment Quality Act that authorized the backfilling of wetlands in the area where the Applicants’ project was to be developed. In return, certain measures had to be taken to offset the environmental impacts caused by the backfilling. In 2012, a memorandum of understanding was entered into by the Applicants and La Prairie with regard to the six phases of the project. The Applicants agreed to take the necessary measures to, among other things, ensure compliance with the measures required in return for the granting of the certificate. Further to that memorandum, an environmental advocacy group initiated the process to obtain an emergency order pursuant to the federal Species at Risk Act to protect the habitat of the Western Chorus Frog. In the beginning of 2015, the Minister of the Environment at the time refused to recommend the making of an emergency order to the Governor in Council. That decision was then set aside by the Fed. Court and referred back to the Minister’s office for reconsideration. In December 2015, the new Minister decided to recommend the making of an emergency order to the Governor in Council. That emergency order was made in June 2016 and had the effect of putting an end to the two last phases of the Applicants’ project (no mention whether the project croaked) by reason of the conditions that it established. In June 2020, and in parallel with other proceedings brought before the courts, the Applicants jointly submitted to the Minister a claim for compensation under s. 64(1) of the SRA in the amount of $22,292,473. On June 29, 2022, the Minister denied the claim for compensation on the ground the losses suffered did not result from “any extraordinary impact” of the adoption of the order. There was therefore no justification for granting “fair and reasonable” compensation pursuant to s. 64(1). In the absence of regulatory guidelines established by the Governor in Council under s. 64(2) of the SRA, the Minister’s decision was based on his compensation policy and on the assessment report prepared by his department. The Fed. Court allowed the J.R. filed by the Applicants, and the Fed. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”

Family Law: Child Protection

Vancouver Aboriginal Child and Family Services Society v. R.R., 2025 BCCA 151 (41921)
There is a publication ban, in the context of child protection. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs to the respondent.”

Leases: Vacant Possession

Delane Industry Co. Ltd. v. Tsawwassen Quay Market Corporation, 2025 BCCA 129 (41847)
In 2005/2006, the parties were in a commercial subleasing relationship specific to retail space in a public market housed within Tsawwassen’s B.C. Ferry Terminal. The sublease required the Applicant, Delane Industry Co. Ltd., pay a portion of costs associated with the market’s common areas. The relationship broke down, the sublease was not renewed and the Respondent, Tsawwassen Quay Market Corporation petitioned for vacant possession. Delane responded with a civil action of its own and the parties have been embroiled in litigation since. A Registrar’s report determined no monies were owing by either side. The report was confirmed by a judge of the B.C.S.C. Delane appealed and also brought a fresh evidence application in support of the appeal and sought J.R. of a decision of a chambers judge denying leave to add a third party as a Respondent to the appeal. All three matters were dismissed. “It is not necessary to consider the motion pursuant to rule 15(3) or the motion for an extension of time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”

Municipal Law: Limitation Periods

Huether, et al. v. Corporation of the Township of McMurrich Monteith, 2025 ONCA 140 (41755)
The Applicants alleged the Respondent, the Corporation of the Township of McMurrich Monteith, failed to properly supervise the construction of a dwelling built on a residential property in the township between 1986 and 1987. The Applicants purchased the property in October 2021 and shortly thereafter discovered significant defects in the dwelling’s foundation. In February 2022, the Applicants commenced an action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the township, arguing these defects had resulted from the township’s negligence in supervising the dwelling’s construction and failing to conduct further inspections, among other things. The township moved for summary judgment on the basis it issued the building permit for the dwelling in 1986 and construction was completed in 1987. The township argued any alleged negligence on its part occurred more than three decades ago and thus the Applicants’ claim was barred by the ultimate limitation period in s. 15(2) of the Limitations Act. In the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the motion judge dismissed the township’s motion for summary judgment, finding the township’s negligence was ongoing and continuous and, therefore, the ultimate limitation period had not yet expired by virtue of s. 15(6)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002. The Ont. C.A. unanimously allowed the township’s appeal and set aside the motion judge’s order. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”

Tax: Abuse of Process

Urbanowski Estate, et al.* v. R., 2025 FCA 73 (41826)
The Applicants were taxpayers who participated in tax schemes under which they claimed fictitious business losses. Their participation was discovered and they were assessed penalties for gross negligence under s. 163(2) of the Income Tax Act. The parties agreed the outcomes of three “informal lead cases” would inform the Crown’s risk assessment in the Applicants’ cases. The informal lead cases were never decided on their merits; the Tax Court allowed the appeals as a remedy for the Crown’s persistent noncompliance with its discovery obligations. The Applicants sought the same remedy in the instant cases. They led no evidence on the motion. The Tax Court held there was no evidence connecting the Crown’s conduct in the informal lead cases with the Applicants’ cases. There was therefore no abuse of process. The Fed. C.A. found no error in the Tax Court’s decision and dismissed an appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs. * For greater certainty, this judgment incorporates by reference the parties named in Schedule A of the Federal Court of Appeal Decision, A-60-24, 2025 FCA 73, dated March 27, 2025.”