Granted
Constitutional Law: Names/Pronouns; Notwithstanding Clause
Government of Saskatchewan as represented by the Minister of Education v. UR Pride Centre for Sexuality and Gender Diversity, 2025 SKCA 74 (41979)
In August of 2023, the Applicant Government of Saskatchewan as represented by the Minister of Education (hereafter, “Saskatchewan”) introduced a policy concerning student names and pronouns (hereafter, the “Policy”). Under the Policy, if students under the age of 16 requested schools use preferred first names and pronouns, parental consent was required. Parental consent was not required for students age 16 and over. The Respondent UR Pride Centre for Sexuality and Gender Diversity (hereafter, “UR Pride”) applied to the Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench for an order declaring the Policy violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter in a manner that could not be justified pursuant to s. 1. Saskatchewan subsequently amended the Education Act. The amendment incorporated the Policy into the Act (at s. 197.4) and declared, pursuant to s. 33 of the Charter, that s. 197.4 operates “notwithstanding sections 2, 7 and 15” of the Charter. The Policy was rescinded. UR Pride then sought to amend its originating application to, among other things: Seek a declaration the amending legislation violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter; and challenge the amending legislation on the basis it violated s. 12 of the Charter. Saskatchewan sought determinations the invocation of s. 33(1) of the Charter ousted the court’s jurisdiction to determine allegations of a violation of s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter, and the litigation was moot in light of the s. 33(1) declaration. The chambers judge: granted UR Pride leave to amend its originating application; determined the court retained jurisdiction to hear the matters regarding alleged breaches of ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter; and declined to determine the question of mootness. A majority of the Sask. C.A. determined the appeal should be allowed in part: those portions of the originating application which sought to have the Policy declared unconstitutional must be struck for mootness. The appeal was otherwise dismissed. “The motions to expedite the applications for leave to appeal and to cross-appeal are granted. The application for leave to appeal…is granted with costs in the cause. The application for leave to cross-appeal is granted. This matter, and the appeal in English Montreal School Board, et al. v. Attorney General of Quebec, et al. (41231), shall be heard separately.”
Dismissed
Animal Law: Mandatory Slaughter Policy
Universal Ostrich Farms Inc. v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2025 FCA 164 (41992)
The Fed. Court dismissed applications for J.R. filed by the plaintiff, Universal Ostrich Farms Inc., regarding two related decisions of the Respondent, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (“CFIA”). The first decision, a notice of disposition issued on December 31, 2024, required the plaintiff to cull all the ostriches on its farm by February 1, 2025, after laboratory tests confirmed the detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in two dead ostriches. The second decision, a denial of exemption dated January 10, 2025, rejected the plaintiff’s application for an exemption to spare at least some of the ostriches in the flock. Both decisions were made under section 48 of the Health of Animals Act and in accordance with the CFIA’s sanitary slaughter policy, which was implemented following the CFIA’s 2022 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Event Response Plan. The Applicant failed to comply with the decision regarding the notice of disposition, as the Fed. Court stayed its execution pending a decision on the application for J.R. filed with it. Following this, a judge of the Fed. C.A., sitting alone, granted a further stay of execution of the decision until the Applicant’s appeal to the Fed. C.A. was decided. The Fed. C.A. unanimously dismissed the Applicant’s motion to present new evidence and the Applicant’s appeal, concluding the sanitary slaughter policy, the notice of disposition, and the refusal of exemption were all reasonable in accordance with applicable case law. “The motion for a stay of execution is dismissed. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Civil Litigation: Time Extensions
Dick, et al. v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union, et al., 2024 BCCA 364 (41823)
Applicant Rodney Daniel Dick sought, and was denied, leave to commence two proceedings in the B.C.S.C. The B.C.C.A. dismissed his applications for extensions of time to file applications for leave to appeal. “The motion for an extension of time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal…is dismissed. It is not necessary to consider the motion to file a lengthy memorandum of argument. In any event, had the motions been granted, the application for leave to appeal would have been dismissed.”
Criminal Law: DUI; Procedural Unfairness
Parenteau v. R., 2025 NBCA 42 (41825)
The Applicant, Mr. Parenteau was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. Mr. Parenteau alleged multiple violations of his rights under the Charter. The trial proceeded by way of a blended trial and voir dire before the Provincial Court of New Brunswick. Mr. Parenteau was acquitted by way of directed verdict. The Crown appealed. The summary conviction appeal judge held the trial judge had prematurely ruled on an issue before the Crown had closed its case. This was manifestly unfair and would cause an informed member of the public to lose confidence in the administration of justice. The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered. The N.B. C.A. granted Mr. Parenteau leave to appeal but affirmed the appeal judge’s decision on the issue of procedural unfairness. The appeal was dismissed. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Family Law: Marriage Agreements
Callahan v. Bradley, 2025 BCCA 69 (41806)
The parties began living together in 1992, married in September 1997, and separated in June 2014. Prior to their marriage, they signed a marriage agreement which provided Mr. Callahan’s business interests, including those he acquired following the parties’ marriage, would not be subject to division. Those business assets grew exponentially in value during the marriage and until the time of trial. The proceedings between the parties included a property division claim that had to be decided under the former Family Relations Act and the approach for determining the fairness of marriage agreements set out in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne. The trial judge found the marriage agreement was valid and operated fairly. He ordered Mr. Callahan to pay Ms. Bradley a lump sum of spousal support. The B.C.C.A. found the trial judge erred. It concluded the agreement was not fair because it allowed Mr. Callahan to keep all the increased value in corporate assets despite Ms. Bradley’s contributions to their growth over a 17-year marriage. It ordered reapportionment of the corporate assets. The award to Ms. Bradley was meant to approximate 25 percent of the increase in the value of corporate assets from the date of the marriage to the time of marriage breakdown, plus a 5 percent return on that increase to the date of trial, less the lump sum award of spousal support made by the trial judge. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”