Granted
Aboriginal Law: Third Party Claims
Skii km Lax Ha, et al. v. Malii, et al., 2024 BCCA 406 (41644)
Representatives of the Gitanyow Nation and representatives of the Tsetsaut/Skii km Lax Ha Nation commenced independent claims before the B.C.S.C. asserting Aboriginal rights and title over lands in British Columbia, in part in respect of overlapping territory. The representatives of the Tsetsaut/Skii km Lax Ha Nation applied for joinder as defendants in the action commenced by the representatives of the Gitanyow Nation and leave to file a third party claim within that action. The B.C.S.C. granted the application. The B.C.C.A. allowed an appeal in part and set aside the part of the order granting leave to file a third party claim. “The application for leave to cross-appeal…is granted. It is ordered that the respondents-on-appeal/appellants-on-cross-appeal shall serve and file their factum, record and book of authorities, if any, in accordance with Rules 43(1) and (2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, by October 23, 2025.”
Dismissed
Civil Litigation: Anti-SLAPP
Vaughan v. Hamilton, 2025 ONCA 98 (41776)
The Applicant, Ms. Vaughan, was a former client of the Respondent, Mr. Hamilton, a lawyer. The solicitor-client relationship deteriorated, and ultimately Mr. Hamilton sued Ms. Vaughan in libel and slander in relation to comments Ms. Vaughan made about him on an online platform. Ms. Vaughan brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss Mr. Hamilton’s claim. The motion judge found the comments related to Ms. Vaughan’s private dispute. Therefore, Ms. Vaughan did not discharge her onus of proving the comments related to a matter of public interest. She dismissed Ms. Vaughan’s motion. The Ont. C.A. agreed with the motion judge there was no public aspect to the comments. It dismissed the appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Assault
R. v. C., 2025 QCCA 321 (41819)
There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of alleged sexual assault. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Employment/Military Law: Covid Dismissal
Zagol v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 40 (41765)
Mr. Zagol was released from the Canadian Armed Forces (“CAF”) because he failed to comply with CAF’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. The Canada Employment Insurance Commission found as Mr. Zagol was dismissed for failing to follow CAF’s policy, he had committed misconduct under s. 30(1) of the Employment Insurance Act and was disqualified from receiving employment insurance benefits. The General Division of the Social Security Tribunal and the Appeal Division of the Social Security Tribunal dismissed the appeals. The Fed. C.A. dismissed Mr. Zagol’s J.R. of the decision of the Appeal Division. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Firearms: Court Jurisdiction re J.R. Revocations
Runkle, et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), et al., 2025 ABCA 84 (41778)
The Applicants were among a group of gun owners who, in July 2020, received a standard form letter from the Registrar of Firearms (“Registrar”) notifying them their firearms had been impacted by regulatory amendments. They were informed their previously restricted firearms were now classified as prohibited under the amended regulations and the registration certificates previously issued to them had been automatically nullified. The Applicants considered the July 2020 letter to be a decision of the Registrar revoking their registration certificates and sought to refer the decision to a provincial court judge for review under s. 74(1) of the Firearms Act. That provision allows provincial courts to review certain decisions by way of reference, including decisions by the Registrar to revoke a registration certificate. The Respondent Attorney General of Canada, representing the Registrar, challenged the jurisdiction of the provincial court to conduct the reference. The summary trial judge concluded the July 2020 letter did not convey any notice of revocation by the Registrar reviewable under s. 74. The Applicants applied to the Court of King’s Bench for a J.R. of the decision. That court applied a binding precedent of the Alta. C.A. — Canada (Attorney General) v. Smykot, 2023 ABCA 131 — which concluded the Registrar’s letter was not a revocation. The Court of King’s Bench concluded Smykot could not be distinguished. The Alta. C.A. dismissed an application to reconsider its Smykot decision and dismissed the Applicants’ appeals. “The applications for leave to appeal…are dismissed with costs.”
Import/Export: Classification
Best Buy Canada Ltd. v. President of the Canada Border Services Agency, 2025 FCA 45 (41780)
The Canadian International Trade Tribunal (“CITT”) dismissed the Applicant, Best Buy Canada Ltd.’s appeal of the classification of certain goods, wine coolers, for tariff purposes. Best Buy brought both an appeal under a statutory appeal provision and a separate J.R. to the Fed. C.A. The Fed. C.A. determined Best Buy’s J.R. adopted its submissions made in the appeal, without adding anything else. The J.R. application was dismissed. “The motion to hold the application for leave to appeal in abeyance is dismissed. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Import/Export: Classification
Best Buy Canada Ltd. v. President of the Canada Border Services Agency, 2025 FCA 45 (41782)
Similar summary to that above. “The motion to hold the application for leave to appeal in abeyance is dismissed. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Import/Export: Duties; J.R.
Skechers USA Canada, Inc. v. Canada Border Services Agency, 2025 FCA 1 (41690)
The Respondent, Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”), in the course of a compliance verification under the Customs Act issued an interim report to the Applicant Skechers USA Canada, Inc. (“Skechers”). It proposed Skechers correct its declarations of the value for duty of imported goods to include commissions paid, including for the prior four years. Skechers disputed the commissions were dutiable and asked, in the alternative, for the corrections to be made on a going forward basis only. The CBSA denied the request. CBSA issued a final report confirming Skechers was required to make the corrections and remit additional duties. Skechers made three further requests to the CBSA: the CBSA rescind its final report, it grant Skechers an indefinite extension of the time for making corrections to its declarations, and it grant Skechers a waiver or cancellation of penalties and interest pending resolution of the disputed duties. At that point in the process, Skechers had not made corrections to its declarations and the CBSA had not made a re-determination of duties or determined penalties and interest payable. The CBSA denied all of Skechers’ requests. J.R.’d the CBSA’s decisions. CBSA brought a motion to strike. An Associate Judge of the Fed. Court granted CBSA’s motion to strike, concluding Skechers’ application was bereft of any possibility of success. The decision was upheld by a judge of the Fed. Court and by the Fed. C.A.; the CBSA’s refusals to accede to Skechers’ requests, based on their essential character, did not trigger a right to J.R. “The motion to hold the application for leave to appeal in abeyance is dismissed. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Labour Law: RCMP
Davis v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2024 FCA 115 (41763)
Ms. Davis was a former employee of the RCMP. She was an indeterminate public service employee, and was not a member of a union. Ms. Davis is also a person with disabilities. The RCMP successfully brought a motion to strike Ms. Davis’ statement of claim on the basis her claim was barred by operation of s. 236(1) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act. Ms. Davis’ motion to appeal the order was dismissed. The Fed. C.A. dismissed her appeal. “The motion for an extension of time to serve and file the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed.”
Municipal Law: Bylaws
Munir v. Garg, et al., 2025 ONCA 334 (41790)
Applicant Zaafir Ahmed Munir brought an application before the Ont. Superior Court of Justice, seeking to have a municipal bylaw declared ultra vires and alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter. The application was dismissed. Mr. Munir’s appeal to the Ont. C.A. was dismissed. “The motion for a stay of execution is dismissed. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs to Town of Milton and Milton Fire Department.”
Oil & Gas: Validity of Provincial Legislation
Gaspé Énergies Inc., et al. v. Québec (Attorney General), et al.¸ 2025 QCCA 629 (41873)
The Applicants were companies engaging in petroleum exploration and production. In court cases against the Respondents that were joined to be heard together, the Applicants called into question the operability and validity of the Act ending exploration for petroleum and underground reservoirs and production of petroleum and brine (“AEE”), alleging it breached their right to peaceful enjoyment and free disposition of their property guaranteed by s. 6 of the Québec Charter. The Superior Court allowed in part the Applicants’ application for a stay and suspended the application of several sections of the AEE during the proceeding. The Qué. C.A. allowed the Respondents’ application for leave to appeal. The Applicants brought a joint motion to review and quash the judgment allowing that application. The Qué. C.A. dismissed the motion, finding it did not have authority to review the manner in which a judge interpreted and applied the criteria of art. 31 para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a specific case. It then allowed the Respondents’ appeal, finding the Superior Court had erred in law on the balance of convenience test. Given the importance of the public interest and the failure to demonstrate public interest benefits that would flow from the suspension of part of the AEE, it set aside the trial judgment and dismissed the stay applications brought by the Applicants. “The motion for a stay of execution of the appeal judgment is dismissed. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs. It is not necessary to consider the motion to strike certain parts of the motion for a stay of execution of the appeal judgment. Justice Kasirer took no part in the judgment.”
Professions/Aboriginal Law/Receivership: Fees
Miracle v. Bogue¸ 2025 ONCA 188 (41804)
In the course of an action by Mr. Miracle seeking the right to profits and ownership of an on-reserve business, Mr. Miracle was represented by Mr. Bogue, a lawyer. The retainer agreement they entered into provided Mr. Bogue would receive “a contingency fee of 25% of the amount awarded by the Arbitrator”, with an appendix stating the fee was to be based on the amount “recovered” with Mr. Bogue’s assistance. Mr. Bogue never rendered a formal account. Mr. Miracle acquired the on-reserve business and a $1,345,646.84 share of the dividend declared by his former business partner’s Trustee in Bankruptcy. In making the receivership award, an application judge found part of the arbitration award had taken effect when the business was transferred to Mr. Miracle in 2018, and Mr. Miracle had acknowledged he owed $2,871,000 to Mr. Bogue and other specified amounts to others in an assignment agreement between Mr. Miracle and his then lawyer. Mr. Miracle’s appeal of the receivership order led to a holding a receiver acting on behalf of a creditor who is not an Indian for the purposes of the Indian Act cannot recoup profits from Mr. Miracle’s on-reserve businesses, but s. 89 did not protect Mr. Miracle’s off-reserve assets from seizure: 2022 ONCA 672. The Trustee in Bankruptcy collected $1,458,725.16, of which Mr. Miracle was entitled to $1,345,636.84, subject to the ability to access those funds. Up to the time of the decision of Mew J., Mr. Bogue had received $13,020.75 towards his fees, but claimed he was owed a further $2,871,000. Inter alia, Mr. Bogue’s motions for declaration of solicitor’s lien and summary judgment on claim and counterclaim were granted. The Ont. C.A. dismissed the appeal. “The motion to add Schwartz Levitsky Feldman Inc. as a respondent is granted. The motion for security for costs is dismissed. The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs in accordance with the Tariff of fees and disbursements set out in Schedule B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.”
Professions: Confidentiality
Sittler, et al. v. Milot Law Professional Corporation, 2025 ABCA 72 (41784)
The Sittlers hired Mr. Milot of Milot Law to act as their counsel in dealing with the CRA and litigation they expected to follow. Without paying the fees owed to Milot Law, the Sittlers assigned themselves into bankruptcy. As a creditor, Milot Law received correspondence from the bankruptcy trustee including the Sittlers’ bankruptcy Statement of Affairs. Based on the information he had received as their lawyer, Mr. Milot realized the Sittlers had not disclosed all of their assets to the trustee. Milot Law sent a letter to the Sittlers and their then counsel saying it would inform the trustee of that situation if they did not disclose all of their assets. When the Sittlers did not respond, Mr. Milot consulted with the practice advisor for the Law Society of Ontario, who reminded him that Rule 3.3 5 of the Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct, like Rule 3.3-5 of the Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Conduct, states that “[a] lawyer may disclose confidential information in order to establish or collect the lawyer’s fees, but the lawyer shall not disclose more information than is required”. Mr. Milot then provided the trustee with redacted versions of records and other information about the Sittlers’ assets and transfers of assets. The trustee requested and received further disclosure from the Sittlers. Milot Law applied to compel Ms. Sittler to attend questioning; the Sittlers cross-applied to, inter alia, prevent anyone from relying on information they believed to be privileged in the bankruptcy proceeding. The chambers judge declared Mr. Milot had only breached duty of privilege and/or confidentiality in one email and Mr. Milot’s obligations regarding confidential information had been changed by the assignment into bankruptcy. He ordered the questioning of the parties. The Alta. C.A. dismissed the Sittlers’ appeal and granted Milot Law’s application to adduce new evidence (the unredacted email string leading to the email) and its cross-appeal. It held the email did not contain privileged information and confidentiality had not been breached. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs.”
Wills & Estates: Limitation Periods
Chartier v. Wilkinson, 2025 BCCA 53 (41774)
Applicant Elaine Janet Whiffin Chartier (hereafter, “Elaine”) and Respondent Diane Ruby Wilkinson (hereafter, “Diane”) were sisters. Their parents owned a residential property (hereafter, the “family residence”) in joint tenancy. Their mother, Ruby Elizabeth Johnston Whiffin (hereafter, “Ruby”), became the sole owner of the family residence following the death of their father in 1994. In 2013, Ruby executed a document transferring title of the family residence to Elaine. Ruby died in January 2017. In December 2019, Diane commenced proceedings on behalf of Ruby’s estate, challenging the validity of the transfer. Elaine applied to have the claims summarily dismissed, on the basis they were statute-barred under the B.C. Limitations Act. The chambers judge granted Elaine’s application and dismissed the claims. The B.C.C.A. allowed Diane’s appeal. “The application for leave to appeal…is dismissed with costs to Diane Ruby Wilkinson in accordance with the tariff of fees and disbursements set out in Schedule B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.”