This special year-end review is a complete legal snapshot of all the law from the Supreme Court of Canada in 2025, and includes:
Each section is arranged in alphabetical order by area of law so you can more easily find the decisions relevant to your practice. We have also included direct quotes from judgments or headnotes in some cases if they provide a useful summary for the reader.
For Leaves to Appeal granted, a hyperlink to the C.A. being appealed is also included.
Appeals
Aboriginal Law: Abuse of Power; Standard of Review; Duty to Consult
Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2023 SKCA 35; 2025 SCC 4 (40740) Feb. 28, 2025
The chambers judge concluded that it would constitute an abuse of process for MNS to proceed with its originating application in the original form; he struck parts of the application. The Court of Appeal overturned the chambers judge’s decision, holding there was no abuse of process. The S.C.C. dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the question to be decided is whether there is an abuse of process; what is not before the S.C.C. are questions regarding the substance of the actions and the application brought by Métis Nation Saskatchewan (MNS) against Saskatchewan, some of which are to be decided in proceedings currently in Saskatchewan. Whether there is an abuse of process is a question of law, so the applicable standard of review is correctness. For clarity: where an abuse of process has been established, a subsequent question arises, the remedy decision is discretionary; being a discretionary decision, it is “generally entitled to deference” and “may only be interfered with if there is a legal error (considered to be an error in principle), a palpable and overriding factual error (viewed as a material misapprehension of the evidence) or a failure to exercise discretion judicially (which includes acting arbitrarily or being ‘so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice’)” (Canada (Transportation Safety Board) v. Carroll-Byrne, 2022 SCC 48, at para. 41, quoting P. (W.) v. Alberta, 2014 ABCA 404, at para. 15). One way in which an abuse of process can arise is by relitigation, that is, “where the litigation before the court is found to be in essence an attempt to relitigate a claim which the court has already determined” (Behn, at para. 40, quoting Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), at para. 56, rev’d 2002 SCC 63). Relitigation will be an abuse of process if it violates “such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice” (Toronto (City), at para. 37; Behn, at para. 41). Where warranted, the doctrine of abuse of process can be relied on to strike pleadings so as to prevent relitigation of an issue. Abuse of process is not limited to relitigation. For example, in Behn, the S.C.C. found that “raising a breach of the duty to consult and of treaty rights as a defence”, in circumstances where the defendants had a fair opportunity to initiate proceedings and raise such claims earlier, was abusive. An inordinate delay that causes serious prejudice can give rise to an abuse of process. A multiplicity of proceedings that engage the same issues can also constitute an abuse of process. However, the fact that there are two or more ongoing legal proceedings involving the same or similar parties or legal issues is, in itself, not sufficient. The duty to consult operates pending a final determination of claims. As such, any arguments that the duty to consult does not arise until after rights and title claims are resolved are inconsistent with the S.C.C.’s jurisprudence. The duty to consult arises “when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it” (Haida, at para. 35; Desautel, at para. 72). In other words, three conditions must exist for the duty to consult to arise: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title; (2) contemplated Crown conduct; and (3) a potential adverse effect on the asserted right.
Bankruptcy & Insolvency: Student Loans
Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2023 BCCA 181; 2025 SCC 13 (40782) Apr. 17, 2025
Section 178(2) of the BIA provides that an order of discharge releases a bankrupt from all claims provable in bankruptcy, except for claims listed in s. 178(1). Specifically, s. 178(1)(g)(ii) provides that an order of discharge does not release the bankrupt from any debt or obligation in respect of a government student loan where the date of the bankruptcy occurred “within seven years after the date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student”. Section 178 also applies to consumer proposals, which provide a quicker, more efficient, and less costly alternative to bankruptcy for individuals under certain circumstances. The question raised on this appeal is: When does a bankrupt cease to be a full- or part-time student under s. 178(1)(g)(ii)? Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and interpreting s. 178(1)(g)(ii) based on its text, context, and purpose, the single-date approach is the correct interpretation. Critically, the single-date approach promotes the statutory purposes or policy goals of this provision: to reduce government losses on student loan defaults; to ensure the sustainability of student loan programs for future generations; and to ensure borrowers have a reasonable time after finishing their studies to capitalize on all their education to allow them to repay their student loans, thus deterring opportunistic bankruptcies. Because the appellant, Ms. Izabela Piekut, was a full- or part-time student until 2009 and filed a consumer proposal only four years later, in 2013, she could not be released from her student loan debt by s. 178(1)(g)(ii) and (2) of the BIA. The appellant also raises a new legal issue for the first time before this Court. She claims that a creditor must obtain a separate court order regarding their claim under s. 178(1)(g) before the claim is enforceable. The Court disagrees. Student loan debts arise under legislation, are easily proved, and fall under s. 178(1)(g) without requiring a separate court order. Contested allegations of fraud are often complex and inherently factual and thus require a separate judicial determination. Student loan debts, by contrast, arise under legislation, are easily established, and do not raise the same problems of proof. This conclusion is confirmed by public guidance issued by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, which states that separate court orders are not required with regard to student loan debts under s. 178(1)(g), even though they may be needed for other debts under s. 178: If it had been less than seven years since the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student at the time the bankruptcy was filed, then the student loan debt falls within paragraph 178(1)(g) of the BIA and is, therefore, an undischargeable debt that will not be released by an order of discharge. No further court order is needed with regard to these debts. Similarly, orders obtained prior to bankruptcy that conclusively bring a debt within section 178 do not require a further court order after the trustee’s discharge. For all other debts alleged to fall under section 178 of the BIA, a court ruling is the only conclusive way to confirm that this is the case, and the onus is on the creditor to prove that its claim falls within subsection 178(1). In addition, here, the appellant acknowledged her student loan debts and led evidence on the amounts owing in her consumer proposal and application for release. The Court therefore rejects the appellant’s argument that a student loan creditor must obtain a judicial determination regarding their claim before it can be enforced under s. 178(1)(g).
Civil Litigation/Private International Law: Jurisdiction
Sinclair v. Venezia Turismo, 2023 ONCA 142; 2025 SCC 27 (40696) July 31, 2025
In cases where parties seek to establish jurisdiction simpliciter in a Canadian forum over a foreign dispute, it is critical that they plead with precision and that courts engage in robust reasoning, including a thorough review of the contract relied upon to assume jurisdiction. Courts should be cautious and not accept tenuous forms of real and substantial connection in the jurisdiction simpliciter context. In cases where there are multiple relevant contracts, courts should analyze each contract, as opposed to relying merely on a vague “constellation of contracts”, which in the present context means a number of related contracts. If the presumptive connecting factor is established, it is for the defendant to assert a rebuttal. The defendant can do so by showing that the presumptive connecting factor does not point to any real relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the contract made in the province or merely indicates a weak relationship between them. In the instant case, three purported contracts are said to ground Ontario’s jurisdiction over the dispute: (1) the Centurion Cardmember Agreement between the Sinclairs and Amex Canada; (2) an arrangement between Amex Canada and Carey International to subcontract the procurement of travel services; and (3) a water taxi contract. While the first contract was formed in Ontario, the same is not true for the second and third contracts. In light of the basic tenets of contract law, the pleadings do not support reliance on the second and third contracts, considered separately or together, to make out Van Breda’s fourth presumptive factor. As to the Centurion Cardmember Agreement, though it is an Ontario contract, the presumption of jurisdiction has been rebutted because the connection between the dispute and Ontario is very tenuous, if not entirely non-existent. A real and substantial connection between the dispute and Ontario is simply not present. A conclusion to the contrary would result in jurisdictional overreach and would run counter to the principles of order and fairness espoused by LeBel J. in Van Breda. To hold otherwise would be to vastly expand the ability of Ontario to assume jurisdiction on the basis of simple credit card transactions made by Ontarians while travelling around the world.
Class Actions: Securities; Secondary Market Disclosure
Lundin Mining Corp. v. Markowich, 2023 ONCA 359; 2025 SCC 39 (40853) Nov. 28, 2025
The motion judge herein erred by relying on restrictive definitions of “change”, “business”, “operations”, and “capital”, and then erred by applying those definitions to determine whether there was a reasonable possibility that there had been a material change. The Ontario legislature intentionally left these terms undefined to allow the legislation to be applied flexibly and contextually to a wide range of industries and corporate structures. The disclosure standards in the Securities Act should be applied to promote the statutory purpose of preventing and deterring informational asymmetry between issuers and investors, while recognizing that the statutory terms at issue acquire meaning by being applied in concrete factual circumstances. By contrast, adopting rigid definitions would ossify the Securities Act and would frustrate the statutory purpose. Moreover, as the S.C.C. previously has stated, the test for leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities Act requires a “plausible analysis of the applicable legislative provisions, and some credible evidence in support of the claim”. A “plausible analysis” is not a plausible statutory interpretation, but rather a plausible application of the legislation to the facts. Statutory interpretation is conducted in accordance with the modern principle, both on a motion for leave and at a trial on the merits. A plausible analysis must, however, show how the legislation applies to the facts by accounting for the limited evidence available on a motion for leave, which is brought before there has been documentary production or oral discovery. Here, the uncontested evidence on the motion was that the pit wall instability and rockslide impacted the company’s operations at its mine. Hence, the evidence showed that these events could have resulted in a “change”. No one challenges the conclusion of the courts below that there is a reasonable possibility these events could be shown at trial to be “material”. Accordingly, a plausible analysis of the applicable legislative provisions and evidence on the motion showed a reasonable or realistic chance that the action could succeed. The distinction between a material fact and a material change, and particularly the requirement that a material change be internal to the issuer, is “deliberate and policy-based” (Kerr, at para. 38). Negotiations and internal deliberations, without more, will not usually amount to a change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer, even if they are material. Care must be taken in using dictionaries to give definitive meaning to terms that a legislature has intentionally left undefined; substituting a dictionary definition for the intentionally undefined term “change” restricts the reach of the legislation, contrary to the legislature’s purpose.
Communications Law: Transmission Line
Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2023 FCA 79; 2025 SCC 15 (40776) Apr. 25, 2025
This appeal is about the proper interpretation of the term “transmission line” in ss. 43 and 44 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38 (“Act”). These provisions are known as the “access regime”. They give telecommunications carriers a qualified right of access to construct, maintain and operate their transmission lines situated on public property. Where the carrier cannot obtain consent to access its transmission lines from the relevant public authority on terms that are acceptable to it, the CRTC is empowered to determine the applicable terms of access. The term “transmission line” only refers to wireline infrastructure. It would be inconsistent with the text, context and purpose of ss. 43 and 44 of the Act to say that Parliament intended the term to extend to antennas. The ordinary meaning of “transmission line” and the text of ss. 43 and 44 have a strong physical and linear connotation that readily applies to wireline infrastructure like wires or cables, but not to antennas. Likewise, the broader context of the Act, including other defined terms and the Act’s legislative history, supports the narrower interpretation. The general policy objectives in s. 7 of the Act do not require the interpretation of “transmission line” that is the most advantageous to the carriers. Parliament’s balancing of the carriers’ interests against those of public authorities must be respected. The narrower interpretation does not lead to absurd consequences nor does it raise federalism concerns, as the carriers have suggested. Ultimately, this is not an appeal about whether wireless service is important to Canadians, nor about whether the Act broadly aspires to technological neutrality. Instead, this appeal is about the proper scope of the CRTC’s power under the Act. The carriers’ interpretation would, as the CRTC itself recognized in the proceedings below, overstep principled limits inherent to the access regime. The CRTC was correct in concluding that it does not have jurisdiction under the access regime to adjudicate disputes over access to 5G small cell antennas situated on public property. Parliament intended to leave access to these sites up to good faith negotiation between carriers and the relevant public authorities such as municipalities. If legislative change is desirable in light of evolving policy considerations, that is the role of Parliament. For these reasons, the S.C.C. agrees with the CRTC and the Court of Appeal that the ordinary meaning of “transmission line” militates against the carriers’ interpretation. It is not consonant with equipment that conveys intelligence with or without wires. The ordinary meaning of “transmission line” thus supports a narrow interpretation of the term and, consequently, a narrow application of the access regime. However, ordinary meaning is not determinative. It is also necessary to consider context and Parliament’s purposes for enacting the provision in question. The Court is not persuaded that a narrow interpretation of “transmission line” is likely to lead to an absurd consequence of impeding the Act’s overall objectives. There was evidence before the CRTC that delays in accessing public property could run up to two years. But the CRTC found that municipalities or other public authorities have not “systematically” interfered with the deployment of 5G infrastructure. This factual finding is entitled to deference. The carriers have failed to establish that regulating access to the wireline and wireless equipment in a network differently would frustrate the orderly deployment of the carriers’ telecommunications infrastructure — 5G or otherwise — across Canada.
Criminal Law: Arrest
R. v. Carignan, 2024 QCCA 86; 2025 SCC 43 (41186) Dec. 12, 2025
Section 495(2) has to be interpreted to determine whether it imposes binding limitations on the power of a peace officer who arrests a person without warrant, such that an arrest that is not in compliance with this provision becomes unlawful. This provision is binding and mandatory. In other words, an arrest that is contrary to s. 495(2) is unlawful under the Criminal Code. This provision is not merely a guideline, a practice guide or a suggestion from Parliament. On the contrary, it obliges a peace officer not to arrest a person without warrant when all of the requirements set out in s. 495(2) are met. And s. 495(3) is to be interpreted so as to determine whether its effect is to deprive an accused of the opportunity to allege an infringement of s. 9 of the Charter and to obtain a remedy under s. 24 in a criminal proceeding relating to the accused’s own criminal liability. This provision applies in very specific cases, namely where a proceeding specifically concerns the liability of the peace officer who made an arrest contrary to s. 495(2) and of any person responsible for that peace officer. On the one hand, s. 495(3)(a) applies where the proceeding is brought under the Criminal Code or any other Act of Parliament and concerns the criminal liability of the peace officer or of persons responsible for that officer. On the other hand, s. 495(3)(b) applies where the proceeding is brought under a statute that is not the Criminal Code or another Act of Parliament. This includes a civil proceeding that concerns the civil liability of the peace officer who made the arrest contrary to s. 495(2) or of persons responsible for that officer. In summary, an analysis of the context of s. 495(1), (2) and (3) reveals a coherent legislative structure in which each provision plays a complementary role; section 495(1) creates a power of arrest without warrant, while s. 495(2) strictly regulates the exercise of this power by imposing binding limitations. The existence of s. 495(3) confirms the normative character of s. 495(2) by setting out protective mechanisms in the event of non-compliance.
Criminal Law: Arrest
R. v. Wilson, 2023 SKCA 106; 2025 SCC 32 (40990) Oct. 24, 2025
The Crown says Parliament deliberately omitted an explicit immunity from arrest from the text of s. 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”), as the police require the power to arrest so that they can search for and seize illegal drugs and prevent the commission of other crimes at the scene of an overdose. The accused responds that immunity from arrest for simple possession of a controlled substance is necessarily implied by the immunity from charge and conviction. Permitting the arrest of people in such circumstances would undermine both the purpose of s. 4.1(2) and the well-established principle that arrest is not available solely for investigative purposes. The Crown’s appeal is dismissed. The immunity from charge and conviction for simple possession explicitly mentioned in s. 4.1(2) of the CDSA includes, by necessary implication, immunity from arrest for that offence. This interpretation best serves the clear purpose of the provision: to save lives. An arrest is a significant infringement of personal liberty. It can give rise to searches incident to arrest and to the prosecution of other criminal offences based on those searches. An interpretation of s. 4.1(2), which allows arrests for possession, and intrusive searches incident to those arrests, would maintain a strong disincentive to seek emergency assistance in life-threatening overdose situations. Parliament did not intend this result. Further, while the word “arrest” is not included in the text of s. 4.1(2), an immunity from charge and conviction would be commonly — and legally — understood to include immunity from arrest for that charge. The frequent mentions of immunity from arrest in the parliamentary debates leading to the adoption of the provision attest to this understanding.
Finally, an interpretation of s. 4.1(2) that provides immunity not only from charge and conviction, but also from arrest on that charge, reflects the fact that our law has never permitted arrest purely for the purposes of investigation and tightly circumscribes the power to arrest and the power to search incidentally to arrest.
Criminal Law: Attempted Murder; Aiding Suicide
R. v. B.F., 2024 ONCA 511; 2025 SCC 41 (41420) Dec. 5, 2025
The S.C.C. allowed the Crown’s appeal, restored B.F.’s conviction for the attempted murder of I.F., and dismissed B.F.’s appeal. The Court of Appeal unnecessarily complicated this matter by holding that the jury needed to be instructed on the distinction between attempted murder under s. 239 of the Criminal Code and aiding suicide under s. 241(1)(b). The distinct offence of aiding suicide was neither charged nor is it a lesser included offence. Further, there was no air of reality to a scenario in which I.F. self-administered the insulin with the intention to end her own life. The trial judge was therefore correct not to address this scenario in his instructions, which properly equipped the jury to decide B.F.’s guilt on all relevant charges. The question of the legal relationship between attempted murder and aiding suicide has no bearing on the appeals. In summary, even if one were to accept B.F.’s submission that I.F.’s voluntary suicide attempt would be relevant to B.F.’s liability for attempted murder, the trial judge would only need to instruct the jury on that theory if it had an air of reality on the record. And the Crown agrees that there is no air of reality to the theory that I.F. voluntarily injected herself with insulin with the intent to end her life. The trial judge appropriately refrained from addressing this theory when instructing the jury. Further in summary, B.F. did not point to any error in the jury instructions that justifies appellate intervention. The instructions did not assert that B.F. had, in fact, procured the insulin pens from her work. Rather, they adequately summarized the pertinent evidence at trial and rightly invited the jury to draw its own conclusion on the evidence.
Criminal Law: Court of Appeal Powers
R. v. Bouvette, 2023 BCCA 152; 2025 SCC 18 (40780) June 6, 2025
An acquittal was entered herein pursuant to s. 686(2). Quoting Crown counsel at the hearing, “an acquittal is an acquittal is an acquittal and the route doesn’t matter”. In light of the Crown’s undertaking not to call evidence even if a new trial were convened, Ms. Bouvette’s acquittal is a foregone conclusion. Here, the Crown has undertaken to this Court, notwithstanding evidence that suggests a conviction is possible, to seek an acquittal and, if a new trial is ordered, not to produce evidence, including the evidence it has in hand. Convening a trial in Ms. Bouvette’s case, where the Crown has said it seeks an acquittal and has undertaken not to adduce evidence at a new trial, would be a pointless exercise and a waste of limited judicial resources. A principled framework for the exercise of s. 686(2) should not permit an appellate court faced with these circumstances to deny an acquittal. To be clear, it remains the appellate court’s power to acquit under s. 686(2), not that of the Crown. In the circumstances, it should be for future courts to scrutinize other purported grounds for acquittal, including those conferring on the appellate court appropriate discretion, in cases where such grounds would actually affect the disposition. They will be in a better position to assess whether, as with the grounds recognized above, entering an acquittal in the circumstance is appropriate in light of the role of the appellate court and the understood meaning of an acquittal. Where there is no other basis for an acquittal as the just outcome, the interests of justice and the circumstances of a given case will ensure that the law develops usefully and even-handedly. Herein, and instances like it, an appellate court can and should exercise its statutory authority to enter an acquittal forthwith, given that the time, expense and uncertainties associated with a hypothetical trial on appeal need not be incurred.
Criminal Law: DUI Evidence
R. v. Larocque, 2024 NBCA 4; 2025 SCC 36 (41155) Nov. 14, 2025
In light of the principles articulated in Rousselle and the reasons that follow, while the Crown must disclose the target value to the accused as required by s. 320.34(1)(b), the Crown does not need to prove the target value at trial to rely on the presumption of accuracy. Parliament did not intend to make the target value itself a precondition, only the fact that the qualified technician conducted a system calibration check, the result of which was within 10% of the target value. Requiring the Crown to prove the target value would amount to reading in an additional technical requirement in s. 320.31(1)(a) in a manner that is contrary to Parliament’s intention as regards this precondition to the presumption of accuracy.
Criminal Law: DUI Evidence
R. v. Rousselle, 2024 NBCA 3; 2025 SCC 35 (41153) Nov. 14, 2025
Section 320.31(1) of the Code establishes a “presumption of accuracy” which allows the Crown to rely on a person’s breath alcohol test results as “conclusive proof” of their blood alcohol concentration at the time the breath tests were conducted. In order to benefit from this presumption, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a series of preconditions set out in s. 320.31(1)(a) to (c). Notably, as part of the precondition in s. 320.31(1)(a), there must be a “system calibration check the result of which is within 10% of the target value of an alcohol standard that is certified by an analyst”. The text, purpose and context of the 2018 evidentiary scheme, together with the legislative evolution of the scheme, lead the S.C.C. to conclude that Parliament intended to maintain the scope of the evidence a qualified technician may give. Consequently, s. 320.31(1)(a) does not preclude the Crown from proving that the alcohol standard used in the system calibration check is “certified by an analyst” through the evidence of the qualified technician, either by certificate or viva voce testimony. The Crown is not required to produce evidence from the analyst, either by certificate or viva voce testimony, to prove this.
Criminal Law: Fit Sentence; Delay; Enhanced Credit
J.W. v. R., 2023 ONCA 552; 2025 SCC 16 (40956) May 23, 2025
The S.C.C. was asked to clarify the meaning of “wrongful conduct” as contemplated in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26 at para. 48, in particular, whether an offender’s pre-trial or pre-sentence delays can constitute wrongful conduct so as to disqualify the offender from pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1). The evidence indicated the appellant’s conduct prior to being found unfit was a consequence, entirely or to a significant degree, of his mental and cognitive state. The appellant’s actions, while having caused significant delays, did not constitute wrongful conduct that would disqualify him from enhanced credit. While conditions in a mental health facility will be different than those in a remand centre, both constitute forms of imprisonment.
Criminal Law: Fitness to Stand Trial
R. v. Bharwani, 2023 ONCA 203; 2025 SCC 26 (40781) July 25, 2025
An accused is fit to stand trial when they are able to make and communicate reality-based decisions in the conduct of their defence or instruct counsel to do so. Conducting a defence includes making decisions that an accused must always make personally and those which relate to the exercise of their right to full answer and defence, such as decisions about pleas, the mode of trial, selection of counsel, whether to testify, whether to call or cross-examine witnesses, and closing submissions, among others. The capacity required to make those decisions is a reality-based understanding of the nature or object of the proceedings and their possible consequences, an ability to understand the available options and their consequences, and an ability to select between those options when making decisions. Fitness to stand trial does not require an accused to make decisions in their best interests. Rather, it requires making decisions based on an understanding of reality that is not overwhelmed by delusions, hallucinations, or other symptoms of their mental disorder. Transient mental health symptoms do not necessarily compromise an accused’s ability to conduct a defence. The focus is always on assessing the extent to which an accused’s mental disorder impairs their understanding of reality when making and communicating decisions in their defence. The definition of “unfit to stand trial” states that the accused must have a “mental disorder” that leaves them unable “to conduct a defence … or to instruct counsel to do so”. Accordingly, a finding of unfitness requires affirmative answers to two questions: (1) Does the accused have a mental disorder and, (2) if so, does that mental disorder render the accused unable to conduct a defence or to instruct counsel to do so? A defence requires taking affirmative actions and making deliberate decisions. At a minimum, this includes those actions and decisions that an accused must always make personally and those which relate to the exercise of their right to full answer and defence.
Criminal Law: Included Offences; Air of Reality Test
R. v. Pan, 2023 ONCA 362; 2025 SCC 12 (40839) Apr. 10, 2025
The Crown appeals from the Court of Appeal’s decision, seeking to restore the convictions for first degree murder. It argues the Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that the lesser included offences of second degree murder and manslaughter should have been left with the jury for this count. This argument invites consideration of the air of reality test as it applies to included offences. The Supreme Court concluded that the included offences had an air of reality herein and that the jury should have been permitted to consider them. As a result, a new trial is necessary for all of the respondents on the first degree murder count. The Respondents each cross-appeal, asking this Court to set aside their convictions for attempted murder and order a new trial on this count. They argue that the trial judge’s error in failing to leave the included offences with the jury tainted the attempted murder convictions in addition to the first degree murder convictions, and thus a new trial is warranted on both counts. The error affects only the first degree murder convictions and provides no basis to disturb the convictions for attempted murder. The respondents also raise various other decisions of the trial judge that they say were in error and provide a basis for ordering a new trial on both counts. Notably, they argue that the trial judge erred in permitting a slide show presentation prepared for the Crown to go with the jury to the jury room, and they invite this Court to consider the legal framework governing this use of jury aids. Applying the proper framework to this case, the Court concludes there was no reversible error in the trial judge’s approach. The other grounds of cross-appeal — that the trial judge erred in dealing with allegations of juror bias and in instructing the jury on the use of propensity evidence — provide no basis for interfering with the convictions, substantially for the reasons of the court below. A legal standard like the air of reality test does not change depending on who is arguing that the test is met; however, where it is the accused rather than the Crown arguing that the included offence should be left with the jury, the court must be cognizant that its ruling will bear on the accused’s right to control his or her own defence. The same consideration will not arise where it is the Crown arguing that the included offence should be left with the jury. The concept of an “air of reality” arises in several distinct contexts. The question, broadly, is always whether the necessary factual inferences are available on a reasonable view of the evidence. However, the approach will naturally differ depending on the types of inferences that are in issue or, in other words, on the conclusion that is said to have an air of reality. In sum, an included offence will have an air of reality if there is a reasonable view of the evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict on the included offence and acquit on the principal offence. The trial judge must ask not only whether the reasonable view of the evidence could allow for doubt as to the distinguishing elements of the principal offence, but also whether the same reasonable view of the evidence could allow the jury to conclude that all elements of the included offence are made out. This raises the question of whether a given view of the evidence is reasonable for this purpose. Factual inferences that reasonably arise on the evidence must be left available to the jury even where the trial judge believes that there are other more plausible inferences that could be drawn. In other words, the exercise of “limited weighing” is not comparative as between competing inferences. That form of comparative analysis is an example of substantive weighing, which is beyond the scope of the air of reality test. In conducting a limited weighing of the evidence, the trial judge is not permitted to assess credibility or reliability. The narrow exception to the rule that the evidence must be assumed to be true is that a bare assertion, without more, may be insufficient to establish an air of reality.
Criminal Law: Judge Alone v. Jury, in COVID Context
Varennes v. R., 2023 QCCA 136; 2025 SCC 22 (40662) July 11, 2025
The parties herein disagreed on whether the Crown can challenge an order relating to the mode of trial in an appeal against an acquittal, and on the standard a trial judge must apply when deciding whether to order a judge-alone trial. On the first issue, the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. On the second issue, the Court of Appeal erred by requiring proof of an abuse of process. Our law recognizes two distinct paths for superior courts to review decisions taken by prosecutors, such as a refusal to consent under s. 473(1). First, superior courts have inherent jurisdiction, including to review core prosecutorial discretion for abuse of process and other prosecutorial decisions on a lower standard. Second, superior courts may order an “appropriate and just” remedy for a rights violation pursuant to s. 24(1), including in anticipation of probable future breaches. Such s. 24(1) remedies can have the effect of overriding a prosecutor’s decision. Either legal framework — inherent jurisdiction or s. 24(1) — could empower a superior court to order a judge-alone trial for an offence listed under s. 469. The Court of Appeal focused on whether inherent jurisdiction applied in this case, but did not consider s. 24(1) as a separate font of jurisdiction. The Crown’s decision whether to consent to a judge-alone trial is not a decision engaging core prosecutorial discretion, and so could be reviewed by the trial judge under her inherent jurisdiction on a standard lower than abuse of process. The trial judge found that proceeding with a jury trial would likely lead to unreasonable delay, and so had jurisdiction to grant her order as a Charter remedy. In sum, the trial judge was entitled to find that without intervention, a breach of s. 11(b) in the future was more likely than not. Given this finding, the trial judge had jurisdiction under s. 24(1) to order a remedy.
Criminal Law: Mandatory Minimums
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Senneville, 2020 QCCA 918; 2025 SCC 33 (40882) Oct. 31, 2025
The minimum sentences set out in s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) violate the protection against cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by s. 12 of the Charter. While the teachings of R. v. Friesen, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, are fully applicable to child pornography offences, which often warrant the imposition of severe penalties, it must be recognized that these offences can be committed in different ways, under different circumstances and by different offenders. A mandatory minimum sentence does not necessarily violate s. 12 of the Charter (R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, at para. 38; R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at p. 1077). However, when the application of a mandatory minimum sentence is broad and covers a wide range of circumstances, the sentence is “constitutionally vulnerable” (R. v. Lloyd, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130, at para. 3; R. v. Hilbach, 2023 SCC 3, at para. 52) because it leaves no choice but to impose a grossly disproportionate sentence on certain offenders.
Criminal Law: Material Benefit & Procuring
R. v. Kloubakov, 2023 ABCA 287; 2025 SCC 25 (41017) July 24, 2025
The material benefit and procuring offences do not prevent taking the safety measures contemplated in Bedford and do not infringe s. 7 of the Charter on this basis. A third party, such as a driver, receptionist, bodyguard, or manager, who provides security services to persons who sell their own sexual services under a cooperative arrangement, could do so lawfully, as long as they do not counsel or encourage such persons to sell sexual services, and provided that the payment or other benefit they receive is proportionate to the value of services they provide (s. 286.2(4)(d)). To interpret “commercial enterprise” under s. 286.2(5)(e) so broadly as to exclude sex workers from lawfully hiring persons who provide security services would nullify s. 286.2(4)(d), a related statutory provision. In summary, s. 286.2(5)(e) does not restrict the ability of sex workers from taking the safety measures contemplated in Bedford. It allows sex workers, either individually or collectively with other sex workers, to enter into business arrangements through which they can hire staff to provide a safe working environment, including drivers, receptionists, bodyguards, or managers, provided that third parties do not profit from the sale of sexual services. Nor does this provision prevent sex workers from operating from not-for-profit safe houses.
Criminal Law: Memory, Capacity and Consent
R. v. Rioux, 2024 QCCA 657; 2025 SCC 34 (41362) Nov. 7, 2025
The S.C.C. agreed with the majority of the Qué. C.A. that there were errors of law of sufficient gravity to set aside the acquittal and order a new trial. A trial judge must assess and weigh all admissible and relevant evidence to determine whether the complainant consented or had the capacity to consent to the sexual activity in question. In addition, though the S.C.C. need not decide the point, if the trial judge relied on the testimony of the appellant as direct evidence of a complainant’s state of mind, it would have been an error to do so. This is so even where the complainant does not have full memory of the sexual activity in question. The trial judge misapprehended and misapplied the law of evidence in the actus reus stage by requiring direct evidence from the complainant when the alleged assault occurred. Another error was that he failed to consider the complainant’s circumstantial evidence when addressing her subjective consent and determining the appellant’s guilt or innocence. His legal conclusions on these matters should have been based on the totality of the relevant, admissible, credible and reliable evidence over the full time, including the complainant’s evidence about her state of mind and physical state before, during and after any sexual activity that took place, as well as any other relevant temporally connected circumstantial evidence. These errors lead to an impermissibly siloed approach to the evidence. Had the trial judge applied the correct principles of law, he could not have proceeded on the erroneous basis that the only evidence he had about her subjective consent at the park was the uncontradicted testimony of the appellant. Under the correct legal principles, the trial judge ought to have considered a much wider range of relevant evidence, some of which conflicted with the appellant’s testimony. His partial assessment of the relevant evidence calls into serious question the soundness of his credibility findings, so that the normal deference attached to such determinations is not warranted. Further, the trial judge needed to reconcile the contradictory evidence of the complainant and appellant about whether he drugged her. While the exact cause of her physical and mental state was not a prerequisite to finding that she lacked capacity to consent, a finding on this disputed fact was crucial to whether the court could legitimately accept the appellant’s assertion that he had an honest but reasonable belief in her communicated consent. Finally, the trial judge would have erred if he used the appellant’s perceptions of the complainant’s state of mind as direct evidence probative of her subjective consent.
Criminal Law: Sentencing; Considerations re Potential Separate Charge
R. v. Di Paola, 2023 QCCA 750; 2025 SCC 31 (40777) Oct. 17, 2025
Section 725(1)(c) has robust procedural safeguards attached to it, and its application relies upon the court’s exercise of its discretion. In addition, in the context of the adversarial process, Crown counsel are subject to duties of fairness that include the duty to act in good faith and to avoid any sharp practice. These protections limit the risk that the application of this provision will result in unfairness or prejudice to the offender. The context of s. 725(1)(c) weighs in favour of the inclusion of any facts forming part of the circumstances of the offence that could constitute the basis for a separate charge, regardless of whether such a charge has already been laid. In light of the principles of sentencing, there is no principled reason for excluding relevant facts from the scope of s. 725(1)(c) solely because a charge based on those facts was already laid and then withdrawn. Those facts do not lose their relevance as aggravating factors for the purposes of s. 725(1)(c), and their consideration is subject to certain procedural safeguards. Whether they have constituted the basis for a separate charge or not, those facts fall within s. 725’s purpose of enabling the court to assess all the circumstances of both the offence and the offender in order to impose a fit and appropriate sentence. In short, the only interpretation consistent with the text, context and purpose of s. 725(1)(c) is the one advanced by the appellant. Section 725(1)(c) gives the court the discretion to consider, as aggravating factors, any facts forming part of the circumstances of the offence that could constitute the basis for a separate charge, regardless of whether such a charge has been laid. This provision is applicable both following a trial and in the context of a guilty plea, to the extent that the charge remains possible at the time of sentencing.
Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Sexual Inactivity Evidence
R. v. Kinamore, 2023 BCCA 337; 2025 SCC 19 (40964) June 13, 2025
Does evidence of a complainant’s sexual inactivity constitute a form of presumptively inadmissible evidence under s. 276 of the Criminal Code and the analogous common law rules governing Crown-led evidence of a complainant’s sexual history. In R. v. R.V., 2019 SCC 41 the Court explicitly left this question open but expressed doubt about appellate authority that has held that such evidence is not captured by these exclusionary rules. The Court now confirms that sexual inactivity evidence is indeed presumptively inadmissible under s. 276 and the common law given that it forms part of a complainant’s sexual history and can evoke distinct myths and stereotypes that these rules seek to eliminate. The second issue relates to the substantive and procedural requirements that apply to Crown-led evidence of a complainant’s sexual history. Subject only to two necessary modifications, the common law rules on substantive admissibility and procedure should align with those that apply to defence-led evidence under s. 276. A harmonized regime for the admission of sexual history evidence will best allow courts to perform their important evidentiary gatekeeping function, without creating the undue complication that parallel regimes could cause.
Criminal Law: Sexual Offences; Sentencing; Appellate Review Standard
R. v. Sheppard, 2023 ABCA 381; 2025 SCC 29 (41126) Sept. 26, 2025
Reviewing reasons functionally means assessing whether they are sufficient not in the abstract, but in relation to the fundamental purposes that reasons serve (Sheppard 2002, at para. 42). Those purposes are to hold judges accountable to the public, to provide an intelligible result to the parties, and to enable effective appellate review (paras. 15, 42 and 55; G.F., at para. 68). What is necessary to achieve those purposes will depend on the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the issues that were in dispute (G.F., at para. 68; R. v. Dinardo, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 31). Under a contextual approach, “[t]he foundations of the judge’s decision must be discernable, when looked at in the context of the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the history of how the trial unfolded” (R.E.M., at para. 17). As the S.C.C. explained in R. v. Parranto, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, “[i]n sentencing, as with any decision, the reasons must, when read in conjunction with the record, show why the judge reached a particular result” (para. 39; see generally R.E.M., at para. 37). Sentencing reasons must also be read and understood in conjunction with the reasons for conviction or, in the case of a jury trial, the verdict and the essential facts it implies. On this approach, an appellate court may intervene only if the reasons are legally or factually insufficient or if they are so muddled that meaningful appellate review is impossible (G.F., at paras. 71 and 108; Sheppard 2002, at paras. 28 and 46; R.E.M., at para. 17). Legal sufficiency requires that the aggrieved party be able to understand the legal basis of the decision in order to meaningfully exercise any right of appeal (G.F., at para. 74; Sheppard 2002, at paras. 64-66). However, it does not require the sentencing judge to expound on uncontroversial features of the criminal law in the context of the case. Sentencing judges are presumed to know the basic principles of criminal law at issue in the case (R.E.M., at para. 45). Factual sufficiency requires that the factual basis for the decision be discernible, even if articulated unartfully (G.F., at para. 71; Sheppard 2002, at para. 55). The functional and contextual approach rejects a fine parsing of reasons in search of error (R. v. Chung, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 405, at paras. 13 and 33). In G.F., Karakatsanis J. expressed concern that some appellate courts continue to parse reasons, often in a manner that attacks the trial judge’s credibility findings. Despite this Court’s clear guidance in the 19 years since Sheppard to review reasons functionally and contextually, we continue to encounter appellate court decisions that scrutinize the text of trial reasons in a search for error, particularly in sexual assault cases, where safe convictions after fair trials are being overturned not on the basis of legal error but on the basis of parsing imperfect or summary expression on the part of the trial judge. Under the Lacasse framework, the appellant must not only identify an error in principle but must also show that the error impacted the sentence. The “impact” criterion dovetails with the functional approach to reviewing the sufficiency of reasons: appellate intervention is permitted only when a deficiency renders the sentence incomprehensible or appellate review impossible. When this is the case, the appellate court is justified in assuming that the deficiency impacted the sentence, since the inherent nature of insufficient reasons is that they make the presence of faulty reasoning impossible to prove. Generally speaking, the usefulness of a historical decision will depend on its factual comparability to the case at hand, as well as on the degree to which relevant legal principles, societal attitudes, and legislative provisions have evolved since the decision was rendered. For example, it is safe to assume that historical jurisprudence will not be useful, at least not on its face, when considering offences that are now viewed through a markedly different lens. To reiterate, sentencing judges are entitled to consider historical precedents, though only insofar as they align with contemporary sentencing principles. This should not be taken to suggest that sentencing judges are required to consider such precedents or that declining to do so is an error in principle.
Criminal Law: Youths Sentenced As Adults
R. v. I.M., 2023 ONCA 378; 2025 SCC 23 (40868) July 18, 2025
The onus of convincing the youth justice court that an adult sentence should be ordered is on the Crown (s. 72(2) YCJA). Section 72(1) sets out what the Crown must prove. An adult sentence shall be ordered when the youth justice court is satisfied that the “presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability” of the young person is rebutted and when a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to “hold the young person accountable” for their offending conduct. When a young person is shown by the Crown to have the maturity of an adult, they lose the benefit of the presumption that would otherwise mean, because of their age, that they receive a youth sentence under the YCJA. Like the presumption itself, rebuttal of the presumption by the Crown therefore rests on proof of a fact: when the young person’s developmental age, contrary to their chronological age, indicates they have the capacity for moral judgment of an adult, the young person is no longer deserving of the presumption’s benefit. Proving that a young person has the developmental age of an adult may of course be more complicated than proving chronological age, but it is no less a factual inquiry that lends itself just as well to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, the rule on rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness in s. 72(1) must be read, if its meaning is uncertain, in a manner that conforms to the Charter. On a proper interpretation of s. 72(1)(a) the Crown thus bears the persuasive burden if the youth justice court is to be “satisfied” that the presumption is rebutted. The seriousness or objective gravity of the offence while relevant at the second stage of the analysis under s. 72(1)(b) has no logical bearing on the determination of whether a young person displays the capacity for moral judgment of an adult at the time of the offence. As such, it is irrelevant to rebutting the presumption in s. 72(1)(a). At the same time, factors that properly fix on the young offender’s developmental age and capacity for moral judgment, such as their mental health and background, need to be considered where they are part of the record. If the presumption is rebutted by the Crown under s. 72(1)(a), a second and distinct requirement must be met before an adult sentence can be ordered. Under s. 72(1)(b), the sentencing judge must be satisfied that a youth sentence would be insufficient to hold the young person accountable for the offence.
Criminal Law: Youths Sentenced As Adults
R. v. S.B., 2023 ONCA 369; 2025 SCC 24 (40873) July 18, 2025
Like the companion case, R. v. I.M., 2025 SCC 23, this appeal asks the Court to determine when a young person should be sentenced as an adult pursuant to s. 72 YCJA. The principles and legal framework applicable to that decision are set out in the reasons in that judgment.
Debtor-Creditor in Québec: Extinctive Prescription
Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Sylvestre, 2023 QCCA 1603; 2025 SCC 30 (41131) Oct. 10, 2025
In Québec civil law, the right to the payment of money under a judgment is prescribed where the creditor fails to exercise the right in a timely manner. The period for “extinctive prescription” of rights resulting from most judgments is set at 10 years by art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec (“C.C.Q.”). If the creditor takes appropriate measures to execute the judgment in keeping with the Code of Civil Procedure, prescription is interrupted and the 10-year clock starts again. As a general rule, the filing and service of proceedings initiated by a creditor to seize their debtor’s property in execution of a judgment interrupts prescription pursuant to art. 2892 C.C.Q. Not surprisingly, where a judicial application is dismissed, the law deems that, retroactively, prescription was never interrupted. Article 2894 C.C.Q. sets this latter rule. The notice of execution is not a distinct procedural act but is part and parcel of the seizure as a “judicial application” that interrupts prescription pursuant to art. 2892 C.C.Q. The legislature intends to allow for interruption when the simplified notice of execution that begins the seizure is filed in court and served on the debtor. In this case, the respondents filed their notice of execution commencing the seizure of the Council’s movable property before the end of the prescription period, thereby showing the requisite diligence to make good on their claim. Serving the notice of execution on the debtor fairly informed the appellant of the respondents’ intention to seize its movable property. When proceedings were introduced by the notice as part of the judicial application for seizure in 2016, prescription was interrupted under art. 2892 C.C.Q. The seizure was later suspended by a bailiff but not dismissed by a court, so it cannot be said that the interruption of prescription was retroactively deemed to have never occurred pursuant to art. 2894 C.C.Q. In its judgment granting leave in this case, the Court asked the parties to provide submissions addressing the applicability of s. 89 of the Indian Act and whether the movable property of the applicant is “situated on a reserve”. The circumstances of this case do not allow for a useful treatment of this question. It is unnecessary to consider the full application of s. 89 of the Indian Act to dispose of the appeal. The parties rightly suggest that addressing s. 89 without a proper factual record or meaningful guidance from the courts below would be unwise.
Division of Powers: Interjurisdictional Immunity
Opsis Airport Services Inc. v. Québec (Attorney General), 2023 QCCA 506; 2023 QCCA 325; 2025 SCC 17 (40786) (40791) May 30, 2025
These appeals afforded an opportunity to look at the contours of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Since the landmark case of Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, the S.C.C. has continued, for the reasons mentioned in that case, to take a cautious approach to the applicability and scope of this doctrine. Despite the Court’s hesitation to make increased use of this doctrine, the jurisprudence shows that it still remains useful. The reasons herein are in line with the decisions rendered by the Court since Canadian Western Bank. Some aspects of the licensing scheme established by the Québec Private Security Act have the effect of giving the administrative body created by the provincial legislature the final say on the manner in which the appellants’ security activities falling within the core of an exclusive federal power are conducted. These impairing aspects of the Act cannot be severed from the rest of the statute, which means that the statute must be declared wholly inapplicable to the appellants pursuant to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. To summarize, two aspects of the Acts licensing scheme meet the second condition for the applicability of the doctrine. First, with regard to agent licences, the impairment arises from the powers that the Bureau has where it determines that the standards of conduct for private security have been violated (s. 30). Second, with regard to agency licences, the impairment arises from the powers that the Bureau has where the directives it issues regarding private security activities are not complied with (s. 29). It is not necessary to consider the parties’ arguments on the doctrine of federal paramountcy.
Elections: Third Party Advertising
Attorney General of Ontario v. Working Families Coalition (Canada) Inc., et al., 2023 ONCA 339; 2025 SCC 5 (40725) Mar. 7, 2025
The challenged spending limit restricts the amount that third parties can spend on political advertising in the year before a provincial election period (the pre-writ year). The election period begins when the writ is drawn up, one month before election day (also called the writ period). Third parties are capped at $600,000 in advertising spending for the entire pre-writ year (s. 37.10.1(2)(b)). By contrast, registered political parties may spend up to $1,000,000 in advertising; this limit applies for only six months before the election period (s. 38.1). In the first six months of the pre-writ year, political parties face no limits on political advertising. The application judge relied on expert evidence suggesting that both a 6- and 12-month spending limit for third parties would promote electoral fairness, and concluded that the challenged provision did not violate s. 3 of the Charter. He determined that third parties could still advertise within the spending limit, and that expensive television advertisements did not contribute to policy debates. The application judge thus concluded that the law respected the right of voters to meaningfully participate in the electoral process through an informed vote. The S.C.C. disagreed. An examination of the extent of low-cost advertising that third parties can still engage in does not capture the broader impacts of the spending limit that, by design, creates absolute disproportionality, or a disproportionality that is so marked on its face that it allows political parties to drown out the voices of third parties on political issues from reaching citizens during an entire year of legislative activity. To interpret the scope of s. 3’s protection, the Court has emphasized free and open participation, respect for the diverse interests of a broad range of citizens, fairness in political discourse, and the importance of citizen participation in political life for public faith in laws and institutions. The purpose of s. 3 is for voters to be effectively represented in government, and to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. A legislative measure that undermines or interferes with citizens’ ability to meaningfully participate in the electoral process will infringe the right to vote; meaningful participation requires that citizens be able to vote in an informed way. The Court’s jurisprudence is clear that s. 3 does not require that all participants in the electoral system be treated equally. However, s. 3 will be infringed if spending limits allow any political actor or third party a disproportionate voice in the political discourse given their role in the electoral process, thus depriving voters of a broad range of views and perspectives on social and political issues. To summarize, the information available to voters in Ontario in the year before an election must include the interests, voices, and views of different citizens and parties. Meaningful participation in the electoral process includes an informed vote, as it is only with access to information that citizens can vote in a way that accurately reflects their preferences. To assess the relative merits of each party and candidate and their positions on the issues of the day, there must be equilibrium or proportionality in the political discourse so citizens have information on diverse points of view. When political parties face no limitations, curtailing the ability of third parties to use platforms that may be effective in reaching certain voters has the potential to overwhelm the political discourse and drown out third parties, interfering with citizens’ access to information letting them weigh and establish their views during an important time in the democratic cycle. On its face, the Act here creates an absolute disproportionality in the availability of information to citizens over a key period, thus impeding their ability to form meaningful preferences, violating s. 3 of the Charter. Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to address whether the anti-collusion and extensive reporting provisions, or the sheer length of the restrictions on their own, also violate the right to vote. Nor is it necessary to assess whether the limit complies with the expressive component of s. 3. The Court added that it may be that in a different case, evidence could assist the court in determining whether spending limits permit an actor to exert undue influence on the political discourse.
Family Law: “Habitual Residence”; Jurisdiction
Dunmore v. Mehralian, 2023 ONCA 806; 2025 SCC 20 (41108) June 20, 2025
On December 9, 2024, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal below with reasons to follow. What follows is a summary of those reasons. What does it mean for a child to be habitually resident in a place for the purpose of determining if a court has jurisdiction to hear a proceeding concerning that child under the Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act? While there are important differences in the principles bearing on cases that fall within and outside the Hague Convention, it remains true, as the S.C.C. said in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398, that residence is a contextual and factual concept that should not be encumbered by unnecessary rigidity. As with the approach adopted in Balev, the court should consider all factors relevant to a child’s residence because this is the approach that best protects children. The guiding principle is not whether the parents had a settled intention to reside in the place, but whether the child was at home there. In this case, the motion judge considered all the relevant circumstances and concluded that the family was residing in Ontario when the child last lived with both parents. There is no basis to interfere with that finding. The Ontario courts were therefore right to dismiss Mr. Dunmore’s motion to have the child immediately returned to Oman. Courts asking where the child is at home should look to “all relevant links and circumstances” (Zafar, at para. 74, citing Balev, at paras. 43-45). This means all relevant circumstances, because the mere fact that the list of factors is not closed does not mean that every imaginable factor will be relevant.
Immigration: Inadmissibility and Removal; Standard of Review
Pepa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FCA 102; 2025 SCC 21 (40840) June 27, 2025
The Appellant asked the S.C.C. to review the decision below on a correctness standard. However, like the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal, the standard of review to be applied is reasonableness. The judicial task is therefore to determine if the IAD decision demonstrates an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrained the decision maker. The appeal is allowed; the IAD had jurisdiction to hear it, and the matter is remitted to the IAD for determination.
Municipal Law/Property: Adverse Possession
Kosicki v. Toronto (City), 2023 ONCA 450; 2025 SCC 28 (40908) Sept. 19, 2025
Ontario’s Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA), which extinguishes both the title and the right of the paper title holder to recover the land 10 years after dispossession, governs this dispute. The legislature has exempted certain public lands from the application of the RPLA for over a century. New exceptions for additional categories of public land have been enacted in related statutes since the last amendments to the RPLA. Although these new exceptions grant explicit protection to provincial parkland, they do not mention municipal parkland. Moreover, despite prospectively abolishing the possibility of acquiring possessory title for land registered under the Land Titles Act, the legislature has preserved matured possessory claims. The preservation of acquired possessory title is also consistent with the RPLA’s purpose as a statute of repose. In this statutory context, to recognize a new common law exception in addition to the exceptions the legislature has set out in s. 16, which would serve to retroactively deprive a claimant of acquired possessory title, would defeat the legislature’s intent. Under the applicable statutory rules, the City’s title to the land herein was extinguished over four decades ago. To accept the City’s argument would be to interfere with the appellants’ matured possessory claim and disregard the applicable statutory scheme.
Municipal Law/Real Estate: Contract Novation
Sainte-Julie (City) v. Investissements Laroda inc., 2023 QCCA 1294; 2025 SCC 44 (41036) Dec. 19, 2025
It is important to consider the legal nature of the obligation arising from this real estate agreement: is it an obligation with a term, whose exigibility is deferred in time, or a conditional obligation, which depends on an uncertain event? In this case, The S.C.C. is of the view that the parties agreed on an obligation with a suspensive term. In other words, the City’s obligation to effect compensation for the value of the “area bank” would not become exigible until the occurrence of events that the parties considered certain, namely cadastral operations allowing for new real estate developments. That being the case, the term was indeterminate because the parties did not know when those cadastral operations would take place, such that it becomes necessary to fix it. Having regard to the nature of the City’s obligation, the situation of the parties and the circumstances, the term must be fixed at December 15, 2015, when Laroda sent the City a demand letter. It was on that date that the City’s obligation with a term became exigible. As for the remedy to which Laroda is entitled, the applicable regime must be determined: is it restitution of prestations or performance by equivalence? Given the fact that novation extinguished the debt resulting from the excess land received by the City that was mistakenly transferred by Larochelle, the restitution of prestations regime does not apply to this area of land (3,898.27 m2). Rather, it is the performance by equivalence regime that applies here, both for the excess received by the City and for the additional area of land (22,807.5 m2) transferred later. As a result, Laroda is entitled to damages equivalent to the market value of the area recognized in the bank, which is to say vacant bulk land free of park fees, as it stood on the date of the term fixed, that is, at the date of the demand letter sent to the City. However, the evidence in the record does not make it possible to determine the market value as of December 15, 2015, of the area recognized in the bank. The case must therefore be remanded to the Québec Superior Court on this question alone so that evidence can be adduced, unless of course the parties come to an agreement on the market value as of December 15, 2015.
Prison Law: Inmate Disciplinary Proceedings; New Issues On Appeal
John Howard Society of Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General), 2022 SKCA 144; 2025 SCC 6 (40608) Mar. 14, 2025
The Court agrees that Shubley and Wigglesworth re true penal consequence test rests on eroded legal foundations. Shubley’s conclusion that disciplinary segregation and loss of earned remission do not engage s. 11 because they do not amount to imprisonment has been attenuated by this Court’s consistent direction that judges must interpret the Charter in a generous, rather than a formalistic, manner that gives effect to the purpose of the right in question. When an inmate faces the risk of disciplinary segregation or loss of earned remission, they face the possibility of additional imprisonment — a true penal consequence. Section 11 therefore applies to Saskatchewan’s inmate disciplinary proceedings involving the adjudication of a “major disciplinary offence”. Moreover, even if the Court had concluded that s. 11 does not apply, the Court is satisfied that s. 68 of the Regulations also infringes s. 7 of the Charter. These infringements cannot be saved by s. 1 of the Charter. JHS acknowledges the question of whether s. 68 of the Regulations infringes s. 11(d) is a new constitutional issue raised on appeal. In Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41, the Court reiterated that it can exercise its discretion “to consider a new issue of law on the appeal where it is able to do so without procedural prejudice to the opposing party and where the refusal to do so would risk an injustice” (para. 22, quoting Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19, at para. 33). The burden is on JHS to persuade this Court to exercise its discretion to consider the new issue in light of all of the circumstances (Guindon, para. 23). Because JHS raises a new constitutional question, “[t]he Court must be sure that no attorney general has been denied the opportunity to address [it]” (ibid.). Consideration of a new issue on appeal is exceptional, and thus this Court’s discretion to hear such an issue should not be exercised routinely or lightly. This is one of the exceptional cases where it is appropriate for this Court to exercise its discretion to consider the new issue. We leave for another day the issue of whether s. 11 of the Charter is engaged if an inmate in Saskatchewan commits a minor disciplinary offence.
Prisons: Transfers; Habeas Corpus
Dorsey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 ONCA 843; 2025 SCC 38 (41132) Nov. 21, 2025
The decision to continue a particular, more restrictive form of confinement instead of placing an inmate in a lower security facility results in a deprivation of liberty. The effect of being continually held in a higher security facility is substantially the same as an inmate being involuntarily transferred to a higher security facility. Both inmates herein face greater restrictions on their daily lives and both are deprived of their liberty relative to the facility in which they potentially ought to be placed. Any distinction between the two is erroneously based on a formalistic understanding of a deprivation of liberty. The existence of alternative procedures does not impact the threshold availability of habeas corpus when a lower security classification is denied to an inmate. Should an inmate prove a deprivation of liberty and raise a legitimate ground to question the legality of the deprivation, a hearing on the merits must follow. The writ is non-discretionary and release, in this case to a lower security facility, remains the remedy; however, courts have a degree of flexibility to impose appropriate conditions on release in the case before them.
Oral Judgments
Criminal Law: Evidence Admission
R. v. Chizanga, 2024 ONCA 545; 2025 SCC 9 (41405), (41370) Judgment rendered Mar. 24, 2025
Rowe J.: “These are appeals as of right from the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder. They appealed their convictions. Justices Sossin and Monahan, for the majority, dismissed the appeals and affirmed the convictions. Madam Justice van Rensburg was dissenting. She would have ordered new trials. Before this Court, as before the Court of Appeal, the appellants submit that the trial judge erred by admitting, as prior discreditable conduct evidence, a surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm. The appellants further submit that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury as to the proper use of this evidence. A majority of this Court would dismiss the appeals, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal. Justice Moreau and I would have allowed the appeals, substantially for the reasons of Madam Justice van Rensburg. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed and the convictions of the appellants are affirmed.”
Criminal Law: Firearms
R. v. Donawa, 2024 ONCA 279; 2025 SCC 10 (41287) Judgment rendered Mar. 26, 2025
Martin J.: “The only issue on this appeal as of right is whether the handgun found by the police in the appellant’s car was a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. We are unanimously of the view it was a firearm. We substantially agree with the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. Accordingly, we would dismiss the appeal.”
Criminal Law: Homicide
R. v. Chicoine-Joubert, 2024 QCCA 488; 2025 SCC 3 (41262) Judgment rendered Feb. 20, 2025
The Chief Justice: “A majority of the Court would dismiss the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal. Justice Jamal, for his part, would have allowed the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge.”
Criminal Law: Homicide
R. v. Underwood, 2024 ABCA 267; 2025 SCC 14 (41434) Judgment rendered April 17, 2025
Karakatsanis J.: “The appellant, Buddy Ray Underwood, was charged with the robbery, kidnapping, and first degree murder of Nature Duperron. A group of five individuals, including the appellant, confined her for several hours during which time she was injected with fentanyl and transported from Edmonton to a remote location near Hinton, where she was beaten and left to die. The trial judge, sitting alone, convicted the appellant as a party to the robbery, kidnapping and second degree murder of Ms. Duperron. The trial judge concluded that the Crown had not established that this was a planned and deliberate murder under s. 231(2) of the Criminal Code. While the trial judge was satisfied that the appellant was a party to the kidnapping of Ms. Duperron, he concluded that the Crown had not met its burden of establishing all elements of the offence of constructive first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code. The Crown appealed the acquittal on the charge of first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in law in his assessment of planning and deliberation and misapplied the legal test for constructive first degree murder. The Court of Appeal of Alberta allowed the Crown appeal, quashed the acquittal and substituted a conviction for first degree murder under both s. 231(2) and s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code. The appellant appeals the first degree murder conviction as of right. We are all of the view that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal at paras. 61 to 81. The trial judge erred with respect to the legal test for a planned and deliberate murder. But for this error of law, the trial judge’s findings of fact, which we accept as they were found, would have led him to convict the appellant of first degree murder under s. 231(2). As this is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, we need not consider whether the Court of Appeal erred in substituting a conviction for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.”
Criminal Law: Party Liability
R. v. Bilodeau, 2024 ABCA 148; 2025 SCC 2 (41320) Judgment rendered Feb. 19, 2025
The Chief Justice: “We are all of the view that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Assault
R. v. P.B., 2024 SKCA 77; 2025 SCC 8 (41422) Judgment rendered Mar. 21, 2025
Rowe J.: “The accused appeals as of right a decision by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal relating to his conviction for sexual assault. Justice Kalmakoff, for the majority, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. Justice Barrington-Foote, dissenting, would have ordered a new trial. Before this Court, as before the Court of Appeal, counsel for the accused submitted that the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons for the verdict, and erred in law in assessing the complainant’s evidence. We would dismiss the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Assault
R. v. R.A., 2024 BCCA 283; 2025 SCC 7 (41421) Judgment rendered Mar. 20, 2025
The Chief Justice: “This appeal comes to us as of right from the Court of Appeal for British Columbia. The issue before us is whether the Court of Appeal erred in setting aside the appellant’s acquittal on the charge of indecent assault and entering a conviction. The appellant argues that the Court of Appeal wrongly concluded that the trial judge erred in holding that the appellant’s conduct did not constitute an assault. We are all of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons found at paras. 17 to 43 of the Court of Appeal’s decision. In our view, when an adult intentionally precipitates sexual contact with a child, it satisfies the elements of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code (formerly ss. 149 and 244 of the Criminal Code): see R. v. R.V., 2021 SCC 10, at para. 52. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the element of force can be satisfied in the circumstances of this case where the child complainant physically initiates the touching of the accused: see R. v. Tyler, 2015 ONCA 599, at para. 10; R. v. K.D.M., 2017 ONCA 510, at para. 36. Such an interpretation gives effect to the broad, encompassing language of the provision and its purpose of safeguarding the bodily and sexual integrity of children: see also R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 154. The trial judge, therefore, erred in relying on the reasoning of Fairclough v. Whipp, [1951] 2 All E.R. 834 (K.B.D.), to hold that the appellant’s actions, which are not in dispute, did not constitute an assault. Fairclough is not authoritative in Canada. The appellant committed an assault when he intentionally had sexual contact with the child complainant. It did not matter that the child complainant physically initiated the contact following the appellant’s invitation. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the conviction is affirmed.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Honest But Mistaken Belief
R. v. Kwon, 2024 SKCA 50; 2025 SCC 11 (41322) Judgment rendered Mar. 27, 2025
Moreau J.: “This is an appeal as of right from the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan. The respondent was found guilty of sexual assault. He appealed his conviction. The Court of Appeal was unanimous that the trial judge made reviewable errors in her treatment of the respondent’s evidence and in her analysis of his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. Justices Barrington-Foote and Drennan, for the majority, found that the verdict was unreasonable and entered an acquittal. Justice Tholl, dissenting, would have quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial. Before this Court, the Crown submits that the majority erred by finding that the verdict was unreasonable. A majority of this Court would allow the appeal, substantially for the reasons of Justice Tholl. Justice Rowe would have dismissed the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority in the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and a new trial is ordered.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Inadequacy of Trial Judge Reasons
R. v. Ouellet, 2025 QCCA 347; 2025 SCC 40 (41785) Dec. 3, 2025
There is a publication ban in this case from below. The appeal was heard on Dec. 3, 2025, and the following judgment delivered orally from the bench the same day.
The Chief Justice: “A majority of this Court would dismiss the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal concerning the inadequacy of the trial judge’s reasons. Justice Côté, for her part, would have allowed the appeal for the reasons given by the dissenting judge.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Text Messages; Prior Sexual History
R. v. Hanrahan, 2024 NLCA 9; 2025 SCC 1 (41220) Judgment rendered Jan. 21, 2025 (Restriction on publication in the NLCA) Jan. 30, 2025
Chief Justice Wagner: “A majority of this Court would dismiss the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority at the Court of Appeal. Justices Kasirer and Jamal would have allowed the appeal. They substantially agree with the dissenting judge that the trial judge erred in law by admitting evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual history with the respondent following the application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, and that this error had a material bearing on the acquittal. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.”
Criminal Law: Sexual Exploitation
R. v. D., 2025 NSCA 18; 2025 SCC 42 (41754) Dec. 11, 2025
There is a publication ban in this case. The appeal was heard on Dec. 5, 2025, and the following judgment delivered orally from the bench the same day.
Rowe J.: “This is an appeal from a decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal by the Crown against an acquittal of Mr. DeSutter by a judge of the Nova Scotia Provincial Court. Justices Martin, Kasirer and O’Bonsawin would allow the appeal substantially for the reasons of Justice Derrick of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. Justice Jamal and I would dismiss the appeal substantially for the reasons of Chief Justice Wood of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and a new trial is ordered on counts 3 and 14 in the information laid on October 25, 2021, relating to sexual exploitation of a person under 18 years of age, contrary to s. 153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.”
Criminal Law: Transmitting Sexually Explicit Material
R. v. W.W., 2025 ONCA 115; 2025 SCC 37 (41730) Judgment rendered Nov. 14, 2025
There is a publication ban in this case, the hyperlink to the S.C.C.-produced oral judgment by Kasirer J. (7:0) on Nov. 14, 2025 is here.
Leaves to Appeal Granted
Aboriginal Law: Overlapping Title Claims
Nisga’a Nation v. Malii, et al., 2024 BCCA 313 (41516) Apr. 24, 2025
The Gitanyow Nation asserted Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown; the first stage of the trial (on title) was set to begin in May 2025. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the Applicant Nisga’a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the action. A case management judge at the B.C.S.C. dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the B.C.C.A. dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s appeal from the first decision.
Aboriginal Law: Overlapping Title Claims
Skii km Lax Ha, et al. v. Malii, et al., 2024 BCCA 406 (41644) Apr. 24, 2025
The Gitanyow Nation asserted Aboriginal rights and title to certain lands in British Columbia and has brought claims against both the federal and provincial Crowns; the first stage of the trial (on title) is expected to begin in May 2025. Another Indigenous group with claims in the area, the Tsetsaut/Skii km Lax Ha Nation (the “TSKLH Nation”), has applied to be added as a defendant and for permission to file a third party application against the Crown, in order to advance its own claim of Aboriginal title to the same territory. TSKLH Nation Chief Darlene Simpson, also known as “Skii km Lax Ha,” has applied for standing in the proceedings. A case management judge of the B.C.S.C. granted the relief sought, and issued a series of orders granting standing to Chief Simpson; authorized the addition of the TSKLH Nation as a defendant in the action brought by the Gitanyow; and granted the TSKLH Nation permission to file a third party application against the Crown in the context of this litigation. A unanimous panel of the B.C.C.A. allowed in part an appeal by the Respondent Gitanyow: it affirmed the orders granting standing to Chief Simpson and adding the TSKLH Nation as a defendant, but it set aside the order allowing the TSKLH Nation to file its own third party application.
Aboriginal Law: Third Party Claims
Skii km Lax Ha, et al. v. Malii, et al., 2024 BCCA 406 (41644) Oct. 9, 2025
Representatives of the Gitanyow Nation and representatives of the Tsetsaut/Skii km Lax Ha Nation commenced independent claims before the B.C.S.C. asserting Aboriginal rights and title over lands in British Columbia, in part in respect of overlapping territory. The representatives of the Tsetsaut/Skii km Lax Ha Nation applied for joinder as defendants in the action commenced by the representatives of the Gitanyow Nation and leave to file a third party claim within that action. The B.C.S.C. granted the application. The B.C.C.A. allowed an appeal in part and set aside the part of the order granting leave to file a third party claim.
Administrative Law: Standing; Privative Clauses
Democracy Watch v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 158 (41576) May 1, 2025
Democracy Watch applied for J.R. of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner. The report concluded the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act (COIA) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The Respondent, Attorney General moved to strike the application, arguing Democracy Watch lacked standing and the application was based on grounds barred from J.R. by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an Applicant from bringing an application for J.R. on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.” On December 5, 2022, the Fed. C.A. ruled the Applicant had public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application. The Fed. C.A. granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for J.R.
Airports: Official Languages
St. John’s International Airport Authority v. Thibodeau, 2024 FCA 197 (41651) Aug. 28, 2025
In January 2018, the Respondent, Mr. Thibodeau, filed six complaints under the Official Languages Act with the intervener, the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada, against the Applicant, St. John’s International Airport Authority (SJIAA), with regard to the violation of ss. 22 and 23 of the OLA related to the language of communication and services. In summary, Mr. Thibodeau alleged the SJIAA: (1) has an exclusively English presence on social media such as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram; (2) has a website with an English-only URL and of which the French version is not of equal quality to the English version; (3) publishes its press releases in English only; (4) makes certain documents on its website, including annual reports and its master plan, available in English only; (5) uploads content on Twitter almost exclusively in English; and (6) displays certain automated teller machine (ATM) signage in English only within the airport. Mr. Thibodeau’s complaints resulted in the issuance of two separate reports by the Commissioner: the first addressed the complaints concerning various types of content posted on social media and online, while the second focused on the complaint related to the ATM. With respect to the first complaint, the Commissioner found the OLA had been breached. The Commissioner recommended all content posted by SJIAA, both on social media and online, be of equal quality in both official languages. With respect to the second complaint, because the Official Languages Regulations expressly designates ATMs as a service within the meaning of s. 23(2) of the OLA, the Commissioner concluded the OLA had been contravened. However, given that the SJIAA had, by the time the report was issued, already replaced the signage with universally recognizable pictograms, the Commissioner declined to issue any recommendations and closed the file. Following the issuance of the Commissioner’s recommendations, Mr. Thibodeau commenced an application under s. 77 of the OLA, seeking a declaration that the OLA had been breached and requesting the Court order SJIAA to issue a letter of apology and award him $9K in damages. The Fed. Court has granted the application for a remedy and ordered the payment of $5K in damages against SJIAA. A majority of the Fed. C.A. dismissed the appeal.
Charter/Freedom of Religion
Vabuolas, et al. v. Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, et al., 2025 BCCA 83 (41816) Nov. 20, 2025
The Respondents, Mr. Gabriel-Liberty Wall and Mr. Gregory Westgarde, former members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, each submitted independent access requests pursuant to s. 23 of the B.C. Personal Information Protection Act (“PIPA”) for the disclosure of religious pastoral notes held by the Applicants Grand Forks Congregation Jehovah’s Witnesses and Coldstream Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, their former Jehovah’s Witnesses’ congregations. Mr. Wall’s request was denied by the Grand Forks Congregation on the grounds the records contained “privileged and confidential religious communications”. Similarly, Mr. Westgarde was initially informed by the Coldstream Congregation no personal information was held, but the Congregation later acknowledged while personal records did exist, they constituted confidential religious communications protected under the common law and the Charter. Dissatisfied with the responses received, the Respondents requested the B.C. Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (“Commissioner”) review the congregations’ decisions. The matter was referred to mediation by the Commissioner. After the failed mediation, the Commissioner assigned an adjudicator to conduct an inquiry under s. 50 of PIPA. Because of the constitutional issues raised, notice was also given to the Respondent the A.G. B.C. Despite finding the impugned provisions infringed the religious freedoms of Applicants and congregational elders Mr. John Vabuolas and Mr. Paul Sidhu under s. 2(a) of the Charter, the adjudicator concluded the infringement was justified under s. 1. The adjudicator ordered the Grand Forks and Coldstream Congregations to produce all records in their custody or control containing Mr. Wall and Mr. Westgarde’s personal information, for her review as the Commissioner’s delegate. The Applicants filed a J.R. of the adjudicator’s decision. The B.C.S.C. dismissed the J.R. and the B.C.C.A. dismissed the appeal.
Civil Litigation: Anti-SLAPP
Prescott, et al. v. Benchwood Builders Inc, et al., 2025 ONCA 171 (41794) Oct. 23, 2025
The Applicants, two homeowners, hired the Respondent company, Benchwood, to renovate their home. Benchwood was a general contracting and construction management business, and the Respondent, Michael Slaven, was one of its co-owners. There were several areas of disagreement between the parties during the renovations. A heated discussion occurred between Mr. Slaven and one of the homeowners. Benchwood performed no further work for the homeowners following this incident. The homeowners subsequently discovered Benchwood had posted photographs of their home online to attract new customers. This angered them and prompted them to post allegedly defamatory statements about Benchwood and Mr. Slaven on social media platforms. In response to these statements, Benchwood and Mr. Slaven commenced an action seeking damages for defamation. The homeowners subsequently brought a motion pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act for an order dismissing the action as a proceeding that limits freedom of expression on matters of public interest. The motion judge agreed with the homeowners and ordered the action be dismissed. The Ont. C.A. allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal of the action.
Civil Litigation: Evidence Destruction
SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation v. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, 2024 ONCA 675 (41543) Apr. 24, 2025
SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation entered into a contract with the predecessor of the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. The contract continued to apply after the incorporation of the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. Both the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and its predecessor breached the contract. When SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation learned of the breach, it demanded an accounting and that the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation preserve the communications, documents, and records related to the breach. Instead, the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation destroyed the relevant documents. SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation sued for breach of contract and alleged destruction of evidence in tort or as a basis for drawing adverse inferences against the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. The ONSC found there had been a breach of contract and awarded damages of US$6,619,737. The Ont. C.A. allowed the appeal in part and reduced the amount of damages awarded by US$922,887.
Class Actions: Multi-Jurisdictional
NHK Spring Co., Ltd., et al. v. Cheung, et al., 2024 BCCA 236 (41451) Nov. 13, 2025
These Leaves arose out of the certification of a national class action alleging the Applicants engaged in an international price-fixing conspiracy. The claim alleged common law conspiracy, a cause of action under s. 36 of the Competition Act, restitution, and unjust enrichment. The Applicants brought an application to stay or dismiss the proceedings on the basis the court lacked territorial competence or jurisdiction. The courts below dismissed the jurisdictional challenge and certified the proceedings as a multi-jurisdictional class proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act.
Class Actions: Settlement Approvals & Retainer Revocations
Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey Leagues Inc., et al. v. Walter, et al., 2024 QCCA 1310 (41532) May 22, 2025
The Respondents Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the Applicants/Interveners, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Québec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams were members of the League. In the class action, the Respondents submitted that the Applicants/Interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Québec, were covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all parties, including the Respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement to replace the release provisions. However, shortly after signing, the Respondents disavowed their signatures and announced they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the Respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are Applicants/Interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the Respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are Applicants/Interveners in this case and announced they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The Applicant/Intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the Applicants/Interveners as far as the Respondents were concerned, but confirmed the Applicants/Interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Qué. C.A. allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court’s decision.
Commercial Leases: Termination
Aphria Inc. v. Canada Life Assurance Company, et al., 2024 ONCA 882 (41665) June 26, 2025
The Applicant, Aphria Inc. (“tenant”), entered into a ten-year lease for commercial office premises with the Respondent landlords and successors (collectively, “landlord”). The tenant served a notice of repudiation on the landlord and vacated the premises. The landlord did not accept the tenant’s repudiation. Ultimately, the landlord sued the tenant for rent owing. The motion judge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the landlord summary judgment for the rent owing plus interest. The motion judge declined to grant the landlord judgment for future rent. The motion judge dismissed the tenant’s cross-motion for summary judgment for a declaration that if rent was owing, the amount was capped at rent owing for two years from the date of default pursuant to the lease. The Ont. C.A. unanimously dismissed the tenant’s appeal. It held that the motion judge did not err by failing to recognize a duty to mitigate on the landlord and did not err in his interpretation of the lease.
Constitutional Law: Division of Powers
Attorney General of Québec v. SGS Canada Inc., 2024 QCCA 460 (41334) Feb. 13, 2025
The Respondent, SGS Canada Inc., was a subsidiary of a foreign company providing inspection, testing, certification and quality control services for Canadian grain intended for interprovincial trade and international export. These services were provided throughout interprovincial transportation, regardless of the means of transportation used, to grain terminals in Canadian ports, as well as during their transhipment and storage in grain elevators or in the tanks of ships. The intervener, the Syndicat des travailleurseuses et travailleurs des industries manufacturières, CSN filed a motion for certification with the Administrative Labour Tribunal (TAT) under the Labour Code. The Union wished to represent grain inspectors and graders employed by SGS in Québec. These inspectors and agents worked primarily at grain elevators located in Québec ports along the St. Lawrence River. SGS notified the Applicant, the Attorney General of Québec, it intended to challenge the jurisdiction of the TAT. It argued the certification of the employees in question does not fall under provincial jurisdiction, but rather under direct federal jurisdiction over the regulation of labour relations because the employment is carried out in the course of a work, undertaking or business within the legislative authority of Parliament within the meaning of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. It asserted, primarily, that the proposed bargaining unit would be composed of employees primarily responsible for inspecting and certifying grain for companies operating “facilities” or “elevators” within the meaning of the Canada Grain Act. As the inspection and certification of grain would be activities related to the operation of these works that have been declared “for the general advantage of Canada” by Parliament under s. 91(29) and 92(10)(c) of the Constitution Act, 1867, it would therefore be up to the Canada Industrial Relations Board to dispose of the application for certification in accordance with the Canada Labour Code. In July 2020, SGS gave its agreement to the composition of the proposed bargaining unit, the representative nature of which was also established. The TAT dismissed the application for certification under the Labour Code. The TAT concluded that the unit covered by the union’s application for certification is subject to derived federal legislative authority and, consequently, dismissed the application. The Superior Court dismissed the J.R. and the Qué. C.A. dismissed the appeal.
Constitutional Law: Names/Pronouns; Notwithstanding Clause
Government of Saskatchewan as represented by the Minister of Education v. UR Pride Centre for Sexuality and Gender Diversity, 2025 SKCA 74 (41979) Nov. 6, 2025
In August of 2023, the Applicant Government of Saskatchewan, as represented by the Minister of Education (hereafter, “Saskatchewan”), introduced a policy concerning student names and pronouns (hereafter, the “Policy”). Under the Policy, if students under the age of 16 requested schools use preferred first names and pronouns, parental consent was required. Parental consent was not required for students aged 16 and over. The Respondent UR Pride Centre for Sexuality and Gender Diversity (hereafter, “UR Pride”) applied to the Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench for an order declaring the Policy violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter in a manner that could not be justified pursuant to s. 1. Saskatchewan subsequently amended the Education Act. The amendment incorporated the Policy into the Act (at s. 197.4) and declared, pursuant to s. 33 of the Charter, that s. 197.4 operates “notwithstanding sections 2, 7 and 15” of the Charter. The Policy was rescinded. UR Pride then sought to amend its originating application to, among other things: Seek a declaration the amending legislation violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter; and challenge the amending legislation on the basis it violated s. 12 of the Charter. Saskatchewan sought determinations that the invocation of s. 33(1) of the Charter ousted the court’s jurisdiction to determine allegations of a violation of s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter, and the litigation was moot in light of the s. 33(1) declaration. The chambers judge granted UR Pride leave to amend its originating application, determined the court retained jurisdiction to hear the matters regarding alleged breaches of ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, and declined to determine the question of mootness. A majority of the Sask. C.A. determined the appeal should be allowed in part: those portions of the originating application which sought to have the Policy declared unconstitutional must be struck for mootness. The appeal was otherwise dismissed.
Constitutional Law: Racial Profiling
Québec (Attorney General) v. Luamba, et al., 2024 QCCA 1387 (41605) May 1, 2025
Mr. Luamba is of Haitian origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code. The trial judge found the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Qué. C.A. was of the view the S.C.C.’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Qué. C.A. did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7.
Constitutional Law/Religious Rights: Division of Powers; Override
English Montreal School Board, et al. v. Attorney General of Quebec, et al., 2024 QCCA 254 (41231) Jan. 23, 2025
An Act re the laicity of Québec was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes included affirming laicity and specifying general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power in s. 52 of the Québec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms. Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Québec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Qué. C.A. arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Québec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Qué. C.A. found the Act does not infringe s. 23.
Contracts: Breach; Contributory Fault
Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. v. Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP, et al., 2024 ONCA 925 (41673) July 17, 2025 (matter settled; Leave withdrawn on Oct. 28, 2025)
4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. owned commercial property and Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP was its property manager. Following a power outage at the property, Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. provided emergency services to temporarily restore power, followed by further services to permanently restore power. 4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. paid Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd.’s invoices for the emergency services, but refused to pay any further invoices. Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. commenced a claim for breach of contract. 4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. claimed contributory fault and sought an apportionment of damages. Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. was awarded summary judgment without any apportionment. The Ont. C.A. allowed an appeal and set aside the summary judgment in part; the claim against Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. should proceed to trial, and Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. can seek apportionment based on the alleged contributory fault.
Criminal Law: DUI; Evidence Exclusion
Korduner v. R., 2025 ABCA 30 (41737) June 12, 2025
Ms. Korduner was a driver involved in an MVA. A responding police officer questioned her while she was being treated in an ambulance. While answering the officer’s questions, Ms. Korduner said she was drunk. She was arrested for DUI. The officer demanded a breath sample. Ms. Korduner refused to provide and was charged with refusing. The trial judge held: Ms. Korduner’s statements were statutorily compelled by the Traffic Safety Act; admitting the evidence would violate the fundamental principle against self-incrimination in s. 7 of the Charter; s. 320.31(9) of the Criminal Code is inconsistent with s. 7 and not saved by s. 1; excluded the evidence and acquitted on both charges. A summary conviction appeal was dismissed. The Alta. C.A. allowed an appeal and ordered a new trial.
Criminal Law: Firearms; Sentencing
R. v. Burke-Whittaker, 2025 ONCA 142 (41786) Oct. 23, 2025
The Respondent attended a funeral for a rapper at a restaurant in North York, Ontario. The parking lot behind the building in which the restaurant was located backed onto Highway 401. Someone in a car started firing shots into the crowd in the parking lot. The crowd scattered and tried to hide. The Respondent took cover behind a dumpster, retrieved a loaded firearm from his satchel, and fired a shot toward a vehicle on Highway 401 after the initial shooting had ceased. No one was injured, and the Respondent later turned himself in. He pled guilty to one count of possession of a loaded or prohibited or restricted firearm contrary to s. 95 of the Criminal Code. The sentencing judge sentenced the Respondent to a conditional sentence of two years less a day to be followed by three years’ probation. The Ont. C.A. granted leave to appeal the sentence and dismissed the Applicant’s appeal of the sentence. The dissenting justice would have allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, and imposed a sentence of 38 months’ incarceration less credit of 17 months.
Criminal Law: Forfeiture
R. v. Nguyen, et al., 2024 QCCA 674 (41400) Jan. 16, 2025
A police investigation into the production of marijuana led to criminal proceedings against 11 individuals. A stay of proceedings was entered for the Respondents in light of unreasonable delays. The Court of Québec dismissed the motion to dismiss the motion for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) of the Criminal Code and s. 16(2) of the CDSA. The Québec Superior Court dismissed the motion for prohibition and certiorari in aid. The Qué. C.A. set aside the Superior Court judge’s decision and stated the Court of Québec did not have the jurisdiction required to deal with motions for forfeiture pursuant to ss. 491.1 and 462.37(2) and s. 16(2).
Criminal Law: Mandatory Minimums
Denis v. R., et al., 2024 QCCA 647 (41401) Apr. 24, 2025
Fictitious advertisements were published by police officers on websites offering escort services, emphasizing the youth of the individuals. Mr. Denis contacted what turned out to be an undercover police officer. The officer mentioned the young woman’s minor age to him at least four times. Mr. Denis was arrested by the police upon entering the room where the “escort” was located. Mr. Denis was found guilty of the offence under subsection 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code. He filed a motion for entrapment and abuse of process, which was dismissed. He subsequently filed a motion to have the mandatory minimum sentence declared invalid and inoperative. Finding the six-month sentence appropriate, the trial judge did not conduct a Charter analysis. The Qué. C.A. dismissed the grounds of appeal except for the issue of the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence and only to declare it invalid and inoperative, pursuant to section 52(1) of the Charter.
Criminal Law: Post-verdict Delay
R.B.-C. v. R., 2024 ONCA 930 (41677) May 15, 2025
There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of post-verdict delay.
Criminal Law: Search
R. v. Chemlal, 2025 QCCA 302 (41766) Oct. 7, 2025
The police conducted a routine check of the Respondent, Mr. Chemlal, with a view to giving him a statement of offence for an offence under the Highway Safety Code. A firearm was discovered as a result of a pat down search conducted in an impromptu manner, while the Respondent was waiting for his statement of offence to be issued. He was immediately placed under arrest for possession of a firearm. Subsequently, during the admission process at the operational centre, the police discovered crack cocaine. The Respondent argued the pat down search was abusive and rendered his arrest, as well as the searches that followed, unlawful. He brought a motion to exclude the evidence at first instance based on alleged infringements of his rights guaranteed by the Charter. The trial judge dismissed the motion. The Respondent was then convicted of three counts, that is, possession and concealed carrying of a prohibited firearm and possession of crack cocaine. He appealed the conviction. The majority of the Qué. C.A. allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and ordered acquittals.
Criminal Law: Sentencing; Indigenous Offenders
R. v. Cope, 2024 NSCA 59 (41431) Mar. 13, 2025
The Indigenous Respondent brutally attacked his common law partner, who is also Indigenous. The Respondent, who was on remand, pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. He sought a sentence that consisted of remand credit plus a two years less a day conditional sentence (CSO), followed by probation in order to obtain community-based, culturally-informed supportive housing and services. His Sentencing Circle recommended he serve no more time in custody and be supervised in the community while accessing services and supports. The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of five to six years. The sentencing judge concluded the Respondent’s incarceration was required to protect the public. The Respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months’ incarceration for breaches of release orders. A remand credit of 18 months was applied to the sentence for aggravated assault. A majority of the N.S. C.A. granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal.
Criminal Law: Sexual Offences
R. v. A. M., et al., 2024 ONCA 661 (41528) May 22, 2025
There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of charges including procuring sexual services, receiving material benefit from sexual services, advertising sexual services and human trafficking.
Language: Bilingualism
La Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick v. The Right Honourable Prime Minister of Canada, et al., 2024 NBCA 70 (41398) Feb. 27, 2025
On the advice of the Prime Minister, the Privy Council Office recommended the Governor General issue an order in council appointing a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick, who was not bilingual. At trial, that appointment was found inconsistent with the bilingualism requirements in ss. 16(2), 16.1(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. The N.B. C.A. set aside that decision on the basis the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor who was not bilingual did not infringe ss. 16(2), 16.1(1), 18(2) and 20(2).
Municipal Law: Assessment Roll Classifications
Ville de Québec v. Jardins de Vérone s.e.c., 2025 QCCA 123 (41748) Oct. 16, 2025
The Respondent, Les Jardins de Vérone S.E.C., was the owner of land situated in the territory of the Applicant, Ville de Québec. The land had “serviced vacant land” that appeared in the information on the unit of assessment on the assessment roll. On March 1, 2018, the Respondent received a construction permit from the City for the erection of a building of 109 dwellings. The work started on April 1, 2018, and occurred without interruption from that date. In July 2018, the Respondent applied to the City’s assessment department to have “serviced vacant land” withdrawn from the information on the assessment roll. In October 2018, the municipal assessor’s representative replied to the application in the negative on the ground no action had been omitted by the assessor with regard to ss. 32 and 244.36 of the Act respecting municipal taxation, so no alteration was needed. The Respondent then brought an application before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (ATQ) under s. 131.2 of the AMT seeking to have the municipal assessor alter the information on the roll, in accordance with ss. 174 para. 13.1.1(a), 57.1.1 and 244.36 of the AMT. The building was not entered on the roll until early summer of 2019. On December 16, 2019, the ATQ rendered a decision in which it agreed with the Respondent by confirming that once a building is situated on land, the assessor must alter the roll by withdrawing “serviced vacant land”, regardless of its value. The ATQ ordered the withdrawal of “serviced vacant land” from the assessment roll retroactively from the date of the beginning of the work. The Court of Québec allowed the City’s appeal. The Superior Court dismissed the J.R. The Qué. C.A. allowed the appeal. It set aside the decisions of the Court of Québec and the Superior Court and restored the ATQ’s decision.
Prisons: Rotational Lockdowns
Diggs, et al. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), et al., 2025 NSCA 20 (41801) Dec. 4, 2025
Applicants Durrell Diggs and Ryan Taylor Wilband were both inmates on remand at the Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility. At the relevant time, the facility was suffering staffing shortages, which resulted in rotational lockdowns of inmates. The Applicants brought habeas corpus applications, arguing that the rotational lockdowns unlawfully deprived them of their residual liberty. The application judge declared the lockdowns were unlawful. The Respondent Attorney General of Nova Scotia appealed. The Nova Scotia C.A. allowed the appeals and set the declarations aside.
Privacy: Social Media
Facebook Inc. v. Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2024 FCA 140 (41538) June 12, 2025
On March 19, 2019 the Respondent Privacy Commissioner of Canada received a complaint under s. 11(1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”), which raised concerns about the Applicant Facebook’s compliance with PIPEDA. The concerns were related to Facebook’s practice of sharing Facebook’s users’ personal information with third party applications hosted on its platform. The complaint was filed in the context of reports related to a professor at the University of Cambridge Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, who launched an application through Facebook’s Platform titled “thisisyourdigitallife” (“TYDL”) in November 2013. Presented to users as a personality quiz, Dr. Kogan could access the personal information of installing users and installing users’ friends. In December 2015, it was reported that user data obtained by TYDL was sold to a corporation named Cambridge Analytica and a related entity, Strategic Communication Laboratories Elections Ltd., who, in turn, used the data purchased from Dr. Kogan to help their clients target political messaging to potential voters in the then upcoming presidential election in the U.S. When TYDL was launched in 2013, it agreed to Facebook’s Platform Policy and Terms of Service. In 2014, Facebook issued a version 2 (v.2) of its communication protocol, Graph API, under which third party developers could no longer request permission to access installing users’ friends unless the app developer, through an expanded access to additional personal information request, can demonstrate the data would be used to “enhance the user’s in-app experience”. When Graph API v.2 was announced, Dr. Kogan’s request for expanded access to additional personal information was denied by Facebook because his intended research use would not enhance user experience. Nonetheless, Dr. Kogan continued to collect data under Graph API v.1 with no additional scrutiny from Facebook. As a result, though only 272 Canadians installed the TYDL app, Facebook estimated these installations lead to the potential disclosure of the data of over 600,000 Canadians. In 2015, when the reports became public, Facebook removed TYDL and asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the user data obtained. Facebook did not notify the affected users their Facebook data had been collected and sold. It was not until 2018 Facebook suspended Dr. Kogan and Cambridge Analytica from its platform. After receiving the complaint, the Privacy Commissioner investigated and concluded Facebook failed to obtain valid and meaningful consent for its disclosures to applications and failed to safeguard its users’ information. As a result, in February 2020, the Privacy Commissioner filed a notice of application in the Fed. Court claiming Facebook was in breach of its obligations set out in Schedule 1 pursuant to s. 5(1)(a). The Fed. Court dismissed the application but the Fed. C.A. allowed the appeal.
Professions: Lawyer Disqualification
Bergeron v. Assemblée parlementaire des étudiants du Québec inc., et al., 2024 QCCA 1264 (41566) May 1, 2025
Mr. Bergeron was expelled from a mock parliament organized by one of the Respondents, the Assemblée parlementaire des étudiants du Québec inc. Some participants said they were afraid of him because of his [translation] “disruptive behaviour”. Mr. Bergeron’s father, Jean Bergeron, a lawyer, quickly became involved in the situation, seeking to have the expulsion decision revoked and to obtain reparation for the damage sustained by his son. The Respondents filed a motion to have Jean Bergeron declared disqualified. The Superior Court found exceptional circumstances warranted declaring Jean Bergeron disqualified. A reasonably informed member of the public knowing the facts of the case would be satisfied he did not have the distance he was required to have. The Qué. C.A. found there was no reviewable error. Public confidence in the proper administration of justice could be compromised if Mr. Bergeron’s father were authorized to continue representing him in the particular circumstances of this case.
Tax: Loss Carrybacks
Bank of Nova Scotia v. R., 2024 FCA 192 (41643) May 22, 2025
The Applicant, Bank of Nova Scotia filed its return for the 2006 taxation year, reported taxable income, and paid such taxes as it calculated to be owing. The Minister of National Revenue later audited the 2006 to 2010 taxation years. In March 2015, there was a settlement agreement requiring additional amounts to be included in the 2006 income. The day before entering into the settlement agreement, the Bank wrote to the Minister to request to carryback a loss from its 2008 taxation year to apply it to offset the increase in its 2006 income. The Minister reassessed the Bank, implementing the audit adjustment and the requested loss carryback, and imposing interest resulting from the reassessment. The Minister applied a provision requiring, for a specified period of time, interest calculated by ignoring the loss carryback. The computing of interest that ignored the loss carryback ceases to apply 30 days after the latest of four end dates listed in s. 161(7)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Income Tax Act. The Minister computed interest by applying s. 161(7)(b)(iv) to ignore the loss carryback until the date the taxpayer requested it. The Bank appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, arguing the interest should have been calculated based on the filing date of the loss year return rather than based on the date of its request to carryback a loss. The Tax Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. The Fed. C.A. dismissed the appeal, concluding that while the text of s. 161(7)(b)(iv) left some ambiguity, the context and purpose strongly favoured its applicability.
Torts: Medmal
Hemmings, et al. v. Padmore, et al., 2024 ONCA 318 (41350) May 15, 2025
Sophia Hemmings was left with a severe brain injury after suffering cardiac arrest during a caesarean section at the Respondent Scarborough Hospital. The Applicants, Sophia Hemmings, by her Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, Rosalie Brown personally, Samantha Camile Gayle and Moses Hemmings, minor by their Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, and Samantha Hemmings (hereafter, the “Hemmings Applicants”), commenced an action against a number of health care practitioners, alleging Sophia’s injuries were caused by their negligence. The parties agreed on the amount of her damages. The action went to trial, solely on the issue of liability. At trial, Dr. Padmore, Dr. Jamensky, and the Hospital were found liable in negligence. The Ont. C.A. allowed appeals brought by Dr. Padmore and the Hospital, and set the judgment as against them aside. The appeal brought by Dr. Jamensky was dismissed.