Civil Procedure: Anti-SLAPP Legislation
1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22 (38374)
“In 2015, Ontario amended the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”) by introducing ss. 137.1 to 137.5, occasionally referred to as anti‑SLAPP legislation. These provisions were aimed at mitigating the harmful effects of strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPPs”), a phenomenon used to describe lawsuits initiated against individuals or organizations that speak out or take a position on an issue of public interest not as a direct tool to vindicate a bona fide claim, but as an indirect tool to limit the expression and deter that party, or other potential interested parties, from participating in public affairs.
Pointes Protection Association, a not‑for‑profit corporation, and six of its members (collectively, “Pointes Protection”) relied on s. 137.1 of the CJA to bring a pre‑trial motion to have a $6 million action for breach of contract initiated against them by a land developer dismissed. The action was brought in the context of Pointes Protection’s opposition to a proposed subdivision development by the developer. The developer claimed that the testimony of the association’s president, at a hearing of the Ontario Municipal Board, to the effect that the developer’s proposed development would result in ecological and environmental damage to the region, breached an agreement between the developer and Pointes Protection that imposed limitations on Pointes Protection’s conduct in respect of the approvals sought by the developer from the relevant authorities for its development. Pointes Protection’s s. 137.1 motion was dismissed by the motion judge, who allowed the developer’s action against Pointes Protection to proceed. The Court of Appeal allowed Pointes Protection’s appeal, granted its s. 137.1 motion, and dismissed the developer’s lawsuit.”
The SCC (9:0) dismissed the appeal.
“Strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPPs”) are a phenomenon used to describe exactly what the acronym refers to: lawsuits initiated against individuals or organizations that speak out or take a position on an issue of public interest. SLAPPs are generally initiated by plaintiffs who engage the court process and use litigation not as a direct tool to vindicate a bona fide claim, but as an indirect tool to limit the expression of others. In a SLAPP, the claim is merely a façade for the plaintiff, who is in fact manipulating the judicial system in order to limit the effectiveness of the opposing party’s speech and deter that party, or other potential interested parties, from participating in public affairs.
In light of the increased proliferation of SLAPPs, provincial legislatures (in Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec) have enacted laws to mitigate their harmful effects. These laws are occasionally referred to as “anti-SLAPP” legislation (2018 ONCA 685, 142 O.R. (3d) 161; Galloway v. A.B., 2019 BCCA 385, 30 B.C.L.R. (6th) 245; Klepper v. Lulham, 2017 QCCA 2069 (CanLII); B. Sheldrick, Blocking Public Participation: The Use of Strategic Litigation to Silence Political Expression (2014)).
At issue here is such a law. In November 2015, the Ontario Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015, S.O. 2015, c. 23 (“Act”), came into force. The Act amended the CJA, by introducing, in relevant part, ss. 137.1 to 137.5
Section 137.1(3) is reproduced for convenience below, with my own emphasis placed on the terms requiring further illumination:
- (3) On motion by a person against whom a proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest.
Fundamentally, this is a two-part analysis. The burden is on the moving party to show that (i) the proceeding arises from an expression made by the moving party and that (ii) the expression relates to a matter of public interest. This is a threshold burden, which means that it is necessary for the moving party to meet this burden in order to even proceed to s. 137.1(4) for the ultimate determination of whether the proceeding should be dismissed.
Accordingly, in determining whether there exist grounds to believe at the s. 137.1(4)(a) stage, courts must be acutely aware of the limited record, the timing of the motion in the litigation process, and the potentiality of future evidence arising. Introducing too high a standard of proof into what is a preliminary assessment under s. 137.1(4)(a) might suggest that the outcome has been adjudicated, rather than the likelihood of an outcome. To be sure, s. 137.1(4)(a) is not a determinative adjudication of the merits of the underlying claim or a conclusive determination of the existence of a defence.
Therefore, I conclude from the foregoing exercise of statutory interpretation that for an underlying proceeding to have “substantial merit”, it must have a real prospect of success — in other words, a prospect of success that, while not amounting to a demonstrated likelihood of success, tends to weigh more in favour of the plaintiff. In context with “grounds to believe”, this means that the motion judge needs to be satisfied that there is a basis in the record and the law — taking into account the stage of the proceeding — for drawing such a conclusion. This requires that the claim be legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief.
Importantly, this standard is more demanding than the one applicable on a motion to strike, which requires that the claim have some chance of success under the “plain and obvious” test (Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.,  2 S.C.R. 959). It is also more demanding than requiring that the claim have a reasonable prospect of success, which is a standard that this Court has also used to animate the “plain and obvious” test (R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42,  3 S.C.R. 45, at paras. 17-20). In light of the existence of a record, the substantial merit standard calls for an assessment of the evidentiary basis for the claim — this is why the claim must be supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief. This is consistent with the APR’s references to “substantive” merit, which inherently calls for an assessment of the basis or evidentiary foundation for a claim. I reiterate, however, that a claim with merely some chance of success will not be sufficient to prevail. Nor will a claim that has been merely nudged over the line of having some chance of success. A real prospect of success means that the plaintiff’s success is more than a possibility; it requires more than an arguable case. As I said in the preceding paragraph, a real prospect of success requires that the claim have a prospect of success that, while not amounting to a demonstrated likelihood of success, tends to weigh more in favour of the plaintiff. For a judge undertaking this inquiry, it is critical to recall that a s. 137.1 motion is not a determinative adjudication of the merits of the proceeding and, rather than having to be established on a balance of probabilities, substantial merit is instead tempered by a “grounds to believe” burden.
The substantial merit standard is less stringent, however, than the “strong prima facie case” threshold, which requires a “strong likelihood of success” (R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5,  1 S.C.R. 196), or the test for summary judgment, under which a legally sound claim supported by evidence reasonably capable of belief may nonetheless raise “no genuine issue requiring a trial” (Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7,  1 S.C.R. 87). While Hryniak was admittedly decided in the context of summary judgment motions, which call for an ultimate determination of the merits of a proceeding, that case is relevant at this juncture in order to assess the role of s. 137.1 motions: such motions do not exist in a vacuum and must necessarily be fulfilling a function different than other motions. Although too low a standard risks defeating the purpose of the distinct process for dismissal established by s. 137.1, too high a standard risks promoting a counter-productive culture whereby parties are forced to routinely compile detailed records similar to those expected on summary judgment motions or even trials.
It is therefore important to recognize how s. 137.1 motions differ from summary judgment motions, as briefly touched on in the preceding section. Section 137.1 motions are made at an earlier stage in the litigation process, with much more limited evidence and corresponding procedural limitations (see s. 137.2). As a result, a motion judge deciding a s. 137.1 motion should engage in only limited weighing of the evidence and should defer ultimate assessments of credibility and other questions requiring a deep dive into the evidence to a later stage, where judicial powers of inquiry are broader and pleadings more fully developed. This is not to say that the motion judge should take the motion evidence at face value or that bald allegations are sufficient; again, the judge should engage in limited weighing and assessment of the evidence adduced. This might also include a preliminary assessment of credibility — indeed, the legislative scheme allows limited cross-examination of affiants, which suggests that the legislature contemplated the potential for conflicts in the evidence that would have to be resolved by the motion judge. However, s. 137.1(4)(a)(i) is not an adjudication of the merits of the underlying proceeding; the motion judge should be acutely conscious of the stage in the litigation process at which a s. 137.1 motion is brought and, in assessing the motion, should be wary of turning his or her assessment into a de facto summary judgment motion, which would be insurmountable at this stage of the proceedings.
Finally, in determining the ambit of “substantial merit”, the statutory context of s. 137.1 must be borne in mind: even if a lawsuit clears the merits-based hurdle at s. 137.1(4)(a), it remains vulnerable to summary dismissal as a result of the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b), which provides courts with a robust backstop to protect freedom of expression.
In summary, in light of the foregoing analysis, to discharge its burden under s. 137.1(4)(a)(i), the plaintiff must satisfy the motion judge that there are grounds to believe that its underlying claim is legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that the claim can be said to have a real prospect of success.
Section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) requires the responding party (i.e. plaintiff) to satisfy the motion judge that there are “grounds to believe” that the moving party (i.e. defendant) has “no valid defence” in the underlying proceeding.
While the burden has admittedly shifted to the plaintiff under s. 137.1(4), it would be unreasonable to encumber the plaintiff at the s. 137.1(4)(a)(ii) stage with the task of anticipating every defence the defendant might raise and then rebutting those defences. Instead, s. 137.1(4)(a)(ii) operates as a de facto burden-shifting provision in itself, under which the moving party (i.e. defendant) must first put in play the defences it intends to present and the responding party (i.e. plaintiff) must then show that there are grounds to believe that those defences are not valid.
In other words, once the moving party has put a defence in play, the onus is back on the responding party (i.e. plaintiff) to demonstrate that there are grounds to believe that there is “no valid defence”.
The word no is absolute, and the corollary is that if there is any defence that is valid, then the plaintiff has not met its burden and the underlying claim should be dismissed. As with the substantial merit prong, the motion judge here must make a determination of validity on a limited record at an early stage in the litigation process — accordingly, this context should be taken into account in assessing whether a defence is valid. The motion judge must therefore be able to engage in a limited assessment of the evidence in determining the validity of the defence.
I interpret the query on validity under s. 137.1(4)(a)(ii) as mirroring the query on substantial merit under s. 137.1(4)(a)(i). Fundamentally, both entail an assessment by the motion judge of the strength of the claim or of any defences as part of an overall assessment under s. 137.1(4)(a) of the prospect of success of the underlying claim. Having (i) and (ii) mirror each other to the extent possible makes sense given the fact that a prototypical s. 137.1 motion will be made in relation to a defamation or tort action and that affirmative defences to such an action normally involve well-articulated tests. The legislative drafting that nests both (i) and (ii) under s. 137.1(4)(a) confirms this interpretation. Indeed, in a defamation action, for example, a claim must be made out, and then the burden shifts to the defendant to identify any affirmative defences to the claim. The way that (i) and (ii) are nested under (a) reflects this: the substantial merit of the claim is analyzed and then the validity of any potential defences. For this reason, I interpret (ii) as an extension of (i), and I would analyze both in a similar fashion whereby the motion judge must first determine whether the plaintiff’s underlying claim is legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that the claim can be said to have a real prospect of success, and must then determine whether the plaintiff has shown that the defence, or defences, put in play are not legally tenable or supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that they can be said to have no real prospect of success. In other words, “substantial merit” and “no valid defence” should be seen as constituent parts of an overall assessment of the prospect of success of the underlying claim.
In summary, s. 137.1(4)(a)(ii) operates, in effect, as a burden-shifting provision in itself: the moving party (i.e. defendant) must put potential defences in play, and the responding party (i.e. plaintiff) must show that none of those defences are valid in order to meet its burden. Mirroring the “substantial merit” prong, under which the plaintiff must show that there are grounds to believe that its claim has a real prospect of success, the “no valid defence” prong requires the plaintiff, who bears the statutory burden, to show that there are grounds to believe that the defences have no real prospect of success. This makes sense, since s. 137.1(4)(a) as a whole is fundamentally concerned with the strength of the underlying proceeding.
At last, I arrive at what is the crux of the analysis. Section 137.1(4)(b) provides that, to avoid having its proceeding dismissed, the responding party must satisfy the motion judge that
- the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.
As I have often mentioned in these reasons, this provision is the core of s. 137.1. The purpose of s. 137.1 is to function as a mechanism to screen out lawsuits that unduly limit expression on matters of public interest through the identification and pre-trial dismissal of such actions. While s. 137.1(4)(a) directs a judge’s specific attention to the merit of the proceeding and the existence of a valid defence in order to ensure that the proceeding is meritorious, s. 137.1(4)(b) open-endedly engages with the overarching concern that this statute, and anti-SLAPP legislation generally, seek to address by assessing the public interest and public participation implications. In this way, s. 137.1(4)(b) is the key portion of the s. 137.1 analysis, as it serves as a robust backstop for motion judges to dismiss even technically meritorious claims if the public interest in protecting the expression that gives rise to the proceeding outweighs the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue.
Statutory interpretation is a contextual exercise that requires reading a provision with and in light of other provisions: accordingly, if the bar is set too high at s. 137.1(4)(a)(i) or (ii), a motion judge will never reach s. 137.1(4)(b) — this cannot possibly be what the legislature contemplated given the legislative history and intent behind s. 137.1. The legislature repeatedly emphasized proportionality as the paramount consideration in determining whether a lawsuit should be dismissed. Weighing the public interest in freedom of expression and public participation against the public interest in vindicating a meritorious claim is a theme that runs through the entire legislative history, and this informs how s. 137.1 should be judicially understood.
The import of s. 137.1(4)(b) is made abundantly evident by looking at the context in which s. 137.1 was enacted. For example, the APR urged that “[t]here should be no special safeguards to prevent abuse. The balancing of interests at the heart of the remedy will allow appropriate disposition of cases” (Summary of Recommendations, para. 20 (emphasis added)). This goal of achieving balance was echoed during the readings of the bill in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario. At second reading, the Attorney General of Ontario stated the following:
- [translation] Balance has been a recurring theme: the need to strike a balance that will dismiss abusive lawsuits while permitting legitimate actions. I can assure you that we have heard everything that has been said to us. Balance is a key feature of this bill.
- (Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2014), at p. 1971 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur))
The theme of balance was raised frequently throughout the debates by multiple members across party lines (Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2014), at pp. 1972-74 (Mr. Lorenzo Berardinetti); p. 1974 (Mr. Chris Ballard); p. 1975 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur)). (See also Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2015), at p. 6017 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur); p. 6021 (Mr. Lorenzo Berardinetti); pp. 6025-27 (Mr. Jagmeet Singh).)
I pause here to explain my use of the expression “weighing exercise” and to briefly address whether there is a substantive difference between a weighing exercise and a balancing exercise, and which exercise s. 137.1(4)(b) requires. This concern was raised by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association as an intervener before this Court.
Here, the provision expressly requires that one consideration “outweig[h]” the other. I am of the view that this is substantively different than if the statute had required that the two considerations be balanced against one another. The difference can be illustrated by the following quantification of weighing and balancing: where one factor must outweigh the other, the ratio between the two must be at least 51/49; in contrast, where one factor must be balanced against the other, a ratio of 50/50, or even 45/55, might be sufficient for a judge to rule in favour of the former. The word “outweighs” necessarily precludes such a conclusion.
While I do not purport to decide for all statutes the definitive difference between weighing and balancing, the fact that the statute here requires that one consideration outweigh the other, and not simply that the considerations be balanced against one another, should be relevant to a motion judge’s consideration of whether the plaintiff has satisfied its burden under s. 137.1(4)(b).
This does not mean that the harm pleaded by the plaintiff should be taken at face value or that bald assertions are sufficient. But I would not go so far as to require a fully developed damages brief, nor would I require that the harm be monetized, as the question here relates to the existence of harm, not its quantification. The statutory language employed in s. 137.1(4)(b) is “harm likely to”, which modifies both “be” and “have been”; this indicates that the plaintiff need not prove harm or causation, but must simply provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of the harm and the relevant causal link. The evidentiary burden might depend on the nature of the substantive law that is applied, although it must be borne in mind that a s. 137.1 motion is not an adjudication on the merits: for example, in a defamation action, harm (and therefore general damages) is presumed, but the plaintiff would still have to support a claim for special damages. Importantly, though, no definitive determination of harm or causation is required.
I add that, naturally, evidence of a causal link between the expression and the harm will be especially important where there may be sources other than the defendant’s expression that may have caused the plaintiff harm (C.A. reasons, at para. 92). Causation is not, however, an all-or-nothing proposition, in the sense that while the causal chain between the defendant’s expression and the harm suffered by the plaintiff may be weaker for some elements of the harm suffered, it might nonetheless be strong for other elements. This is a case-by-case inquiry undertaken by the motion judge.
Once harm has been established and shown to be causally related to the expression, s. 137.1(4)(b) requires that the harm and corresponding public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue be weighed against the public interest in protecting the expression. Therefore, as under s. 137.1(3), public interest becomes critical to the analysis.
However, the term “public interest” is used differently in s. 137.1(4)(b) than in s. 137.1(3). Under s. 137.1(3), the query is concerned with whether the expression relates to a matter of public interest. The assessment is not qualitative — i.e. it does not matter whether the expression helps or hampers the public interest. Under s. 137.1(4)(b), in contrast, the legislature expressly makes the public interest relevant to specific goals: permitting the proceeding to continue and protecting the impugned expression. Therefore, not just any matter of public interest will be relevant. Instead, the quality of the expression, and the motivation behind it, are relevant here.
Indeed, “a statement that contains deliberate falsehoods, [or] gratuitous personal attacks . . . may still be an expression that relates to a matter of public interest. However, the public interest in protecting that speech will be less than would have been the case had the same message been delivered without the lies, [or] vitriol” (C.A. reasons, at para. 94, citing Able Translations Ltd. v. Express International Translations Inc., 2016 ONSC 6785, 410 D.L.R. (4th) 380, at paras. 82-84 and 96-103, aff’d 2018 ONCA 690, 428 D.L.R. (4th) 568).
While judges should be wary of the inquiry descending into a moralistic taste test, this Court recognized as early as R. v. Keegstra,  3 S.C.R. 697, that not all expression is created equal: “While we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity, it is equally destructive of free expression values, as well as the other values which underlie a free and democratic society, to treat all expression as equally crucial to those principles at the core of s. 2 (b)” (p. 760).
The weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b) can thus be informed by this Court’s s. 2 (b) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms jurisprudence, which grounds the level of protection afforded to expression in the nature of the expression (R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2,  1 S.C.R. 45, at para. 181). For example, the inquiry might look to the core values underlying freedom of expression, such as the search for truth, participation in political decision making, and diversity in forms of self‑fulfilment and human flourishing (Sharpe, at para. 182; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R. 877, at para. 24). The closer the expression is to any of these core values, the greater the public interest in protecting it.
I outline below some further factors that may bear on the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b). I note that in Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 687, 426 D.L.R. (4th) 60, at para. 99, Doherty J.A. made reference to recognized “indicia of a SLAPP suit” (emphasis omitted). He recognized four indicia in particular: (1) “a history of the plaintiff using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics”; (2) “a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff”; (3) “a punitive or retributory purpose animating the plaintiff’s bringing of the claim”; and (4) “minimal or nominal damages suffered by the plaintiff” (para. 99). Doherty J.A. found that where these indicia are present, the weighing exercise favours granting the s. 137.1 motion and dismissing the underlying proceeding. The Court of Appeal for Ontario has since applied these indicia in a number of cases (see, e.g., Lascaris v. B’nai Brith Canada, 2019 ONCA 163, 144 O.R. (3d) 211).
I am of the view that these four indicia may bear on the analysis only to the extent that they are tethered to the text of the statute and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislature. This is because the s. 137.1(4)(b) stage is fundamentally a public interest weighing exercise and not simply an inquiry into the hallmarks of a SLAPP. Therefore, for this reason, the only factors that might be relevant in guiding that weighing exercise are those tethered to the text of s. 137.1(4)(b), which calls for a consideration of: the harm suffered or potentially suffered by the plaintiff, the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue, and the public interest in protecting the underlying expression.
Accordingly, additional factors may also prove useful. For example, the following factors, in no particular order of importance, may be relevant for the motion judge to consider: the importance of the expression, the history of litigation between the parties, broader or collateral effects on other expressions on matters of public interest, the potential chilling effect on future expression either by a party or by others, the defendant’s history of activism or advocacy in the public interest, any disproportion between the resources being used in the lawsuit and the harm caused or the expected damages award, and the possibility that the expression or the claim might provoke hostility against an identifiably vulnerable group or a group protected under s. 15 of the Charter or human rights legislation. I reiterate that the relevance of the foregoing factors must be tethered to the text of s. 137.1(4) (b) and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislature to conduct the weighing exercise.
Fundamentally, the open-ended nature of s. 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on in the particular case before them: s. 137.1(4)(b) effectively allows motion judges to assess how allowing individuals or organizations to vindicate their rights through a lawsuit — a fundamental value in its own right in a democracy — affects, in turn, freedom of expression and its corresponding influence on public discourse and participation in a pluralistic democracy.
In conclusion, under s. 137.1(4)(b), the burden is on the plaintiff — i.e. the responding party — to show on a balance of probabilities that it likely has suffered or will suffer harm, that such harm is a result of the expression established under s. 137.1(3), and that the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue outweighs the deleterious effects on expression and public participation. This weighing exercise is the crux or core of the s. 137.1 analysis, as it captures the overarching concern of the legislation, as evidenced by the legislative history. It accordingly should be given due importance by the motion judge in assessing a s. 137.1 motion.”